Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine was aimed at toppling the Kyiv government to denazify and demilitarize the country.
So far, none of these goals has been achieved, although Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly expected Kyiv to fall within two days from the Feb. 24 invasion. However, the stalled military advance did not stop the head of Russia’s Main Operations Directorate last week from announcing that Moscow had accomplished the first phase of its operation in Ukraine, and would focus its action in the eastern region of the country. It has yet to been seen whether this is a cover for Russia to regroup and carry out a more brutal campaign later, or an about-face step back from a war that is “unwinnable,” as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said on March 24.
What is clear is that it is the fierce resistance put up by the Ukrainian army and civilians that stalled Russia’s military advance. As one of the most attentive onlookers, Taiwan must have taken note of how to replicate Ukraine’s success in the event of an invasion by China: asymmetrical weaponry deployment, diplomatic appeals to world leaders and brave face-to-face confrontation with invading troops, as seen in media coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
However, this perception of easy victory could prove to be a deadly miscalculation for Taiwan’s security.
Taiwan’s landmass is about one-20th that of Ukraine, with a population that is 10 times higher. In the event of a Chinese invasion, Taiwan would not have Ukraine’s luxury of being able to thin out artillery attacks over a vast area. Instead, every inch of the island would become the target of the Chinese People Liberation Army’s bombardment if Taiwan’s air defense system fails to intercept the airborne attacks.
Using the extent of damage to Ukrainian cities caused by Russia’s shelling to gauge the possible damage that the PLA would inflict on Taiwan would be too optimistic. So far, in spite of Russia’s heavy bombing, many of the Ukrainian cities under attack still have their city center largely intact, and total civilian casualties have been in the order of several thousands. This is because Russia has been trying to distance itself from indifferent targeting of civilians.
However, a similar refrain should not be expected from the PLA. China’s continued barbarous destruction of its own culture and historical heritage makes it unquestionable that an invading China would give no consideration to Taiwan’s infrastructure. Moreover, Beijing’s brutal treatment of its own people — as seen in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and during the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre — can serve as a reliable indicator that the lives of Taiwanese would weigh less than air in the eyes of the Chinese army.
Banking on mobilizing diplomatic solidarity with world leaders to bring in support for Taiwan, as what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has been doing for his country since the outbreak of war, can be equally futile. Ukraine is a sovereign state recognized by the entire world, while Taiwan is recognized by only more than a dozen countries. If countries do not dare to openly support Taiwan in peace time because they are afraid of economic retaliation from China, how could Taiwan expect their support in war time when China is determined to destroy anything and everything in its way of conquering Taiwan?
However, the most dangerous misinterpretation of Ukraine’s resistance is to extrapolate from the Russian troops’ restrained reaction to Ukraine’s civilian hostility that the same resistance tactic could be employed after Chinese troops have landed on Taiwan’s soil. Those Chinese troops would be the most barbaric army Taiwanese could have ever dared imagine. They would treat Taiwanese standing in front of them not as human beings to kill, but objects to destroy. Faced with such an army, any attempt to dissuade it through reasoning would invite nothing but more brutality.
If one has difficulty grasping the brutality that invading troops from China would be capable of displaying, the Great Translation Movement (GTM) might serve as a showcase. The GTM is a crowd-sourced online platform aimed at exposing to the outside world the most popular online and offline opinions publicly circulating in China, where the only opinions allowed to circulate freely are those endorsing or being endorsed by China’s official stand, thanks to Beijing’s iron-fisted censorship system, the Great Firewall.
So, is there no hope for Taiwan in the face of a Chinese invasion?
Once the first shot is fired over the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s fight for security would have already failed at least by half. To avoid losing the second half, Taiwan must show an unwavering will to defend its territory. China’s strength is its mighty military mass. However, China has a fatal weakness: its low morale — from foot soldiers and generals to leaders at the top. Thus, Taiwan’s ability to paralyze China’s key military units and accurately target the Chinese military leadership and above at the outbreak war would trigger a collapse of China’s military unity from within, dealing a great blow to China’s resolve and greatly helping Taiwan’s defense.
In the worst scenario where China’s troops set foot on Taiwan’s territory, a full scale military-civilian resistance would be the only option if Taiwan wants to avoid a decade-long slaughter (as seen in Tibet and the rest of China since the 1949 establishment of the People’s Republic of China). Although Chinese troops would show no mercy for the lives of others, they do have a great fear for their own. Taiwan can turn this fear to its own advantage.
If China ever decides to invade Taiwan, it is not because China cherishes Taiwan, but because it wants to possess Taiwan. Leaving Taiwan in rubble or a thriving habitat after invasion makes no difference to China. Hong Kong has demonstrated this perfectly to the world with its rapid deterioration in the past three years. The school of thought that China might reconsider its military venture if Taiwan threatens to destroy its semiconductor industry upon China’s invasion shows a lack of understanding of China’s Taiwan policy. Moreover, any illusion that a peace-oriented dialogue with China would quench Beijing’s thirst to possess Taiwan is nothing but wishful thinking.
Taiwan’s best defense is to deter China’s aggression attempts. To fully deploy an effective deterrent system, Taiwan must, in addition to building up its weaponry and mobilizing reserves, make the best use of the current peace to persuade as many free countries as possible to recognize Taiwan’s sovereign status and to commit to its defense when its sovereignty is violated. Even a successful expulsion of invaders is not a true victory if the price is destruction of the homeland.
Daniel Jia is founder of the consulting firm DJ LLC Integral Services in Spain.
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