Three years ago, Taiwanese media reported that the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology was developing three new missiles: the Tien Kung III (Sky Bow III, 天弓三) surface-to-air low-altitude air defense missile; the Tien Chien II (Sky Sword II, 天劍二) medium-range air-to-air missile; and the Hsiung Feng IIIE (Brave Wind IIIE, 增程雄風三), an extended range variant of the Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. The weapons, which are reportedly ready for mass production, represent a huge leap forward in realizing the military’s “multilayered deterrence” strategy.
When the new missiles were announced, criticism from some quarters said they were unnecessary and would drain the defense budget.
After legislators passed a special defense budget in January to boost spending on air and naval capabilities, the existence of another new missile was revealed following more than a decade of rumors. The Hsiung Sheng (Brave Ascent, 雄昇) surface-to-surface land-attack cruise missile was ready for mass production. The news put an end to the naysayers.
While it is still possible to class the Tien Kung III, Tien Chien II and Hsiung Feng IIIE as defensive weapons, the Hsiung Sheng, with a reported range of 1,200km, is unquestionably an offensive missile. Fired from Taiwan proper, it is capable of hitting targets deep inside China.
QUIET AGREEMENT
Taiwan’s powerful new offensive strike capability might have been expected to attract criticism, yet there has been none. The reason should be obvious: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
As strategic weapons evolved and modernized, Ukraine gave up its aging Soviet-era nuclear deterrent. In contrast, Taiwan’s indigenous nuclear weapons program, dubbed the Hsinchu Project, was halted after the former deputy director of the institute’s nuclear division, Chang Hsien-yi (張憲義), defected to the US, and Washington pressured Taipei to shut down the project.
The result of Taiwan and Ukraine’s lack of a nuclear weapon is the same: The militaries of both nations cannot threaten a nuclear “fountainhead counterstrike” as a strategic deterrent against their respective enemies.
Taiwan researched and developed medium-range missiles because older missiles needed to be replaced, and reform and modernization of the military has for a long time been predicated on the assumption that Washington would not dispatch soldiers to assist Taiwan in a war with China.
This thinking has been proven correct by events in Ukraine.
CEASEFIRE
The Tien Kung III, Tien Chien II and Hsiung Feng IIIE missiles have been in development for more than a decade.
Under the “diplomatic ceasefire” cross-strait policy of former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, the missile programs were slowed or suspended. The “diplomatic ceasefire” lasted only a few years before China resumed its intimidation and military threats toward Taiwan.
Taiwan is not Canada or Palau. With the US as its neighbor, Canada only needs to maintain modest armed forces, while Palau has no independent military and relies on the US for its defense.
Although Washington has significantly eased restrictions on military hardware sales, Taiwan still needs to build and maintain defense self-reliance and grow its domestic defense industry.
Will Wei is an engineer in the machining industry.
Translated by Edward Jones
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