When retired army colonel Hsin Peng-sheng (辛澎生) was found guilty of spying for China, the prosecution was dissatisfied with his six-month prison sentence and appealed the case.
However, he was found not guilty by a court of appeal, and he has been acquitted again in a retrial.
The judges’ reasoning was that there are no facts or evidence to prove that Hsin developed a spying organization on behalf of China.
Unsurprisingly, the judges of the High Court’s Kaohsiung branch took a simplistic view and followed the letter of the law, because they are not worldly wise and do not know much about how such spying organizations are developed.
After coming into contact with the Political Work Department of China’s Central Military Commission, Hsin frequently accepted invitations to banquets, and even introduced his friends to personnel of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
Face-to-face meetings, building rapport and socializing regularly are how mobsters build their organizations. To make a good impression, the mobsters do a favor for someone, then that person introduces them to their friends — that is how the gang grows.
Whether Hsin was given any tasks to carry out should be thoroughly investigated.
Despite being a high-ranking officer, Hsin lacked the self-discipline to avoid suspicion of espionage, but instead repeatedly contacted the other side and accepted dinner invitations. Then, he got more people involved by “telling his friends about the good food.”
This obviously went beyond simple friendship or love for his compatriots. Rather, it was aimed at growing the organization by attracting other weak-willed people with military connections.
Thinking about it from another angle might make it even easier to understand. Nobody would think it appropriate for judges to accept dinner invitations from people involved in the cases they try in their courtrooms.
However, it would not be proper for them to meet and chat with such people, or even introduce them to other court colleagues or parties to the case.
Hsin’s case is no different.
Chen Chi-nung is a former reserve political warfare officer who works in the field of education.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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