Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in August 2020 accused the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of leading Taiwan into a perilous situation as it allegedly pursued a foreign policy that leans heavily toward the US and antagonizes China.
At a forum organized by the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, titled “A Nation Unsafe,” Ma also criticized Tsai for not acknowledging the so-called “1992 consensus,” which he said had eliminated the basis of mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing.
This was a complete inversion of the truth. In reality, it is China that has for the past decade been flexing its muscles in the Asia-Pacific region, militarizing the South and East China seas, and using “wolf warrior” diplomats to harass and coerce neighboring nations, including Taiwan.
During the past three decades, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has jettisoned its anti-communist stance and pivoted toward China, shunning its traditional ally, the US. The highly ideological nationalist wing of the party has for many years agitated for “rapid unification” with China, while more moderate party members have tried to have their cake and eat it: playing Washington off against Beijing while riding the gravy train of China’s booming economy.
However, as the Chinese philosopher Mencius (孟子) said: “You cannot sup on fish and bear’s paw at the same time” — sometimes you have to make a choice between two courses of action.
There are tentative signs — merely the slenderest of green shoots at this stage — that the KMT could be in the foothills of a major foreign policy shift: pivoting away from China and back toward the US.
The first sign was the party’s announcement last month that it would reopen a liaison office in Washington, which was closed by Ma after he took office. At a news conference, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) vowed to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy and re-engage with Washington.
Another sign came from across the Taiwan Strait.
The state-run People’s Political Consultative Daily on Saturday labeled KMT legislators Lin Wei-chou (林為洲) and Charles Chen (陳以信) “secret Taiwanese independence advocates.” While Beijing habitually denounces Democratic Progressive Party politicians, targeting KMT legislators in this way is unprecedented.
Chen told reporters that the path forward for the KMT involves growing closer to the US while being more amicable with China, and called for a more balanced outreach to both sides.
One theory is that Beijing launched the attack in an attempt to sow division within the KMT and scupper the party’s pivot to Washington.
The latest indication that the KMT could be undergoing a metamorphosis is a security forum held by the KMT-affiliated National Policy Foundation, which began on Wednesday.
The general tone at the forum was positive, consensual and avoided scaremongering or hyping up the threat from China. Chi Yue-yi (亓樂義), an expert on China’s military, is a case in point. Chi said that China is unlikely to attain the military capability to launch an all-out invasion of Taiwan for at least 10 years, but added that there is a high risk that it might initiate limited “gray zone” conflicts to force Taipei to the negotiating table. This is a more optimistic timeframe than recent assessments made by the Pentagon.
It is too early to tell whether the KMT’s US pivot is more than a cosmetic change, and voters should remain skeptical. The ball is in the KMT’s court to prove whether it can meaningfully rebalance its foreign policy and distance itself from Beijing.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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