As last year drew to a close, Russia had massed troops near its border with Ukraine; China had flown military jets near Taiwan; North Korea was still pursuing its nuclear-weapons program; and Taliban fighters were patrolling the streets of Kabul. Seeing all this, friends asked me: “Whatever happened to soft power?”
One answer is that it can be found in other recent events, such as US President Joe Biden’s virtual Summit for Democracy, which was attended by representatives from more than 100 countries. Having been excluded, China took to the airwaves and social media to proclaim that it had a different and more stable type of democracy than the one being extolled by the US. What we were seeing was a great-power competition over soft power, understood as the ability to influence others by attraction rather than by coercion or payment.
When I first wrote about soft power in 1990, I was seeking to overcome a deficiency in how analysts thought about power generally, but the concept gradually acquired more of a political resonance. In some respects, the underlying thought is not new; similar concepts can be traced back to ancient philosophers such as Lao Tse (老子). Nor does soft power pertain only to international behavior or to the US. Many small countries and organizations also possess the power to attract; and in democracies, at least, soft power is an essential component of leadership.
Still, the concept is generally associated with international relations. As the EU developed into its current form, European leaders increasingly made use of the term. Ever since 2007, when then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) declared that China must develop its soft power, the government has invested billions of dollars in that quest. The challenge is for China to implement an effective smart-power strategy. If it can effectively pair its growing hard power with soft power, it will be less likely to provoke counter-balancing coalitions.
Soft power is not the only or even the most important source of power, because its effects tend to be slow and indirect. However, to ignore or neglect it is a serious strategic and analytic mistake. The Roman Empire’s power rested not only on its legions, but also on the attraction of Roman culture and law. Similarly, as a Norwegian analyst once described it, the US’ presence in western Europe after World War II was “an empire by invitation.” No barrage of artillery brought down the Berlin Wall; it was removed by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had been touched by Western soft power.
Smart political leaders have long understood that values can create power. If I can get you to want what I want, I will not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. If a country represents values that others find attractive, it can economize on the use of sticks and carrots.
A country’s soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture; its political values, such as democracy and human rights (when it upholds them); and its policies (when they are seen as legitimate because they are framed with an awareness of others’ interests). A government can influence others through the example of how it behaves at home (such as by protecting a free press and the right to protest), in international institutions (consulting others and fostering multilateralism), and through its foreign policy (such as by promoting development and human rights).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, China has tried to use so-called “vaccine diplomacy” to bolster its soft power, which had been damaged by its secretive handling of the initial outbreak of the virus in Wuhan. The government’s efforts have been aimed at reinforcing its Belt and Road Initiative, which supports infrastructure projects in many parts of the world.
However, international polls show that the results have been disappointing. In measures of attractiveness, China lags behind the US on all continents except Africa, where the two countries are tied. One reason for China’s lower level of soft power is its heavy-handed use of hard power in pursuit of an increasingly nationalist foreign policy. This has been on full display in its economic punishment of Australia and in its military operations on the Himalayan border with India.
China has a smart-power problem. After all, it is difficult to practice vaccine diplomacy and “wolf warrior diplomacy” (aggressive, coercive browbeating of smaller countries) at the same time.
True, international polls showed that the US also suffered a decline in soft power during former US president Donald Trump’s administration. Fortunately, the US is more than its government. Unlike hard-power assets (such as armed forces), many soft-power resources are separate from the government and are only partly responsive to its purposes. For example, Hollywood movies showcasing independent women or protesting minorities inspire others around the world. So, too, does the charitable work of US foundations and the freedom of inquiry at US universities.
Firms, universities, foundations, churches and protest movements develop soft power of their own. Sometimes their activities reinforce official foreign-policy goals, and sometimes they are at odds with them. Either way, these private sources of soft power are increasingly important in the age of social media.
The Jan. 6 insurrection at the US Capitol last year certainly damaged US soft power, but those who would mourn the death of the US’ democracy prematurely should bear in mind that the 2020 election drew an unprecedented turnout despite the pandemic. US citizens are still able to unseat a demagogue in a free and fair election.
This is not to suggest that all is well with US democracy or its soft power. Trump eroded many democratic norms that must be restored. Biden has made strengthening democracy at home and abroad a goal of his presidency, but the results remain to be seen.
No one can be certain about the trajectory of any country’s soft power, but there is no doubt that influence through attraction will remain an important component of world politics. As Mark Twain is famously claimed to have quipped, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” The same is true of soft power.
Joseph Nye is a professor at Harvard University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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