In a speech marking the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on Thursday last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) rehashed Beijing’s long-standing principle of Taiwan’s “peaceful unification with the mainland,” highlighting that China would “take resolute action to utterly defeat any attempt toward ‘Taiwan independence.’”
In Taipei, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) not long after Xi’s speech retaliated by affirming Taiwan’s determination to firmly safeguard “the nation’s sovereignty, and Taiwan’s democracy and freedom.”
Xi’s firm stance attracted global attention, as President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been resolute in her refusal to a “peaceful unification,” which has been mentioned repeatedly by Chinese leaders since a speech by Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) in 1984.
In the words of Deng, “reunification of the motherland is the aspiration of the whole nation. If it cannot be accomplished in 100 years, it will be in 1,000 years.”
Xi would likely continue to embrace Deng’s basic tenet, given the “strongman” leadership style and a long-term vision shared by the two leaders.
However, the Tsai administration would by no means kowtow to Beijing.
Since assuming office, Tsai has been skeptical of pursuing closer ties with China, let alone unifying with the giant neighbor.
Amid the tit-for-tat involving leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and China’s growing coercive activities near Taiwan, the central question should not be framed as “who is right and who is wrong?” but “would peaceful unification be feasible?”
Taiwanese have a sensitive attitude toward China’s quest for “peaceful unification.”
Taiwan’s 23 million people find the idea of “peaceful unification” with China unappealing, and even maintain a wary posture toward Beijing’s proposal.
A survey conducted by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center in December last year found that only 1 percent of respondents advocated unification as soon as possible, and only 5.6 percent were in favor of “maintaining the ‘status quo’ while moving toward unification.”
This is the lowest figure since 1994, when the university began to examine these attitudes.
Moreover, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy found that Taiwanese have been determined to defend their country.
Asked about the possibility that China might use force against Taiwan to reach unification, nearly 70 percent of respondents in a 2019 survey expressed their willingness to defend Taiwan.
Last year, the number increased significantly, to about 80 percent.
Regarding cross-strait relations, the possibility of Taiwan being territorially united by China is not a future that Taiwanese wish to accept.
Since Hong Kong’s democracy movement has been oriented toward opposing the CCP’s interference, the emergence of localism in the territory might likely have a spillover effect on Taiwan.
Taiwanese and the government have been closely watching Hong Kong’s democracy movement while remaining cautious toward Beijing’s promotion of “one country, two systems” — a step toward eventual unification with China.
Taiwanese realize that under the specter of unification with China, the events in Hong Kong might become the future of Taiwan.
In January 2019, Tsai rejected China’s interpretation of the fictitious “1992 consensus,” and instead proposed a “Taiwan consensus,” saying that “the vast majority of Taiwanese” have been in opposition to “one country, two systems.”
During the 108th Double Ten National Day celebration the same year, Tsai continued to strongly reject China’s “one country, two systems” model, calling for the opposing of Chinese hegemony in the region.
China’s “diplomatic offensives and military coercion pose a serious challenge to regional stability and peace,” she said.
The message became even clearer when Tsai reiterated her firm stance that she “will not accept the Beijing authorities’ use of ‘one country, two systems’ policy to downgrade Taiwan and undermine the cross-strait ‘status quo.’”
To make the situation worse, leaders from both sides of the Strait are not getting along well with each other and are unlikely to make a conciliatory gesture to initiate cross-strait dialogue.
In a speech at the start of the annual meetings of the Chinese National People’s Congress in May last year, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強) left out the word “peaceful” when referring to Beijing’s desire to annex Taiwan, and said that China would “resolutely oppose and deter any separatist activities seeking Taiwan independence,” indicating an apparent policy shift that comes as ties with Taipei continue on a downward spiral.
In response to Li’s omission of the word “peaceful,” the MAC reiterated that “the Taiwanese people firmly reject efforts to suppress Taiwan,” highlighting the need to uphold respect and parity when discussing cross-strait relations.
In March, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) expressed China’s firm stance and reaffirmed that Taiwan must be unified with China, as it belongs to China’s so-called “core interests.”
Amid escalating tensions in the Strait, Vice President William Lai (賴清德) in his opening remarks at the Global Taiwan National Affairs Symposium accentuated the government’s promise to its people, including “safeguarding sovereignty with no room for compromise,” adding that Taiwan is a sovereign state and that “the two [nations] are not affiliated with each other.”
As a lack of trust continues to shape the perceptions of Taiwanese, the prospect of peaceful unification is losing its appeal — as a matter of fact, it is increasingly viewed as the prattle of the CCP, irrelevant to the realities of democratic Taiwan.
In light of those difficulties, Beijing might have to re-evaluate the likelihood of peaceful unification with Taiwan, especially recognizing that Taiwanese do not appear to have been won over by China’s courting.
Jonathan Sullivan, a professor at the University of Nottingham, has said that “Taiwan is not a colony a la Hong Kong, and it has everything to lose and nothing to gain from agreeing to” unification.
The prospect of peaceful unification, which has been the guiding principle of China’s engagement with Taiwan, has clearly lost its previously waning feasibility.
Domestic political and social trends in Taiwan are behind this change visible at the popular and elite levels.
Public opinion research points to the overwhelming preference for maintaining the “status quo” — de facto independence — over pursuing unification with China, and Tsai as the nation’s decisive president who will likely continue to stay uncompromising when dealing with Beijing on core sovereignty issues.
The government might have learned lessons from the case of Hong Kong, which has prompted it to persistently remain vigilant, uphold durable democratic values and consolidate the scope of official and unofficial diplomatic ties.
To Chinese leaders, peaceful unification continues to be non-negotiable.
However, with the pushback from Taiwan, unification would not be easy, and peaceful unification would be even more challenging.
China lacks careful preparation for figuring out exactly what it should do — as an aspiring great power — to accommodate Taiwan, rather than impose its immutable hard line on the nation’s democracy.
This might continue to render China’s conception of peaceful unification a mere utopian dream.
Huynh Tam Sang, an international relations lecturer and research fellow in Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities’ Center for International Studies, is a junior researcher at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation.
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