Australia’s decades-long battle to acquire a new French-designed attack submarine to replace its aging Collins class fleet bears all the hallmarks of a bureaucratic boondoggle.
The Attack-class submarine project, initially estimated to cost A$20 billion to A$25 billion (US$15.6 billion to US$19.5 billion at the current exchange rate), had by 2016 doubled to A$50 billion, and almost doubled again to A$90 billion by February last year.
Because of delays, the French-led Naval Group consortium would not begin cutting steel on the first submarine until 2024, which means the first vessel would not be operational until after 2030 — and the last of the fleet of 12 not until almost 2060.
Australia cannot afford to wait decades for new submarines. The threat from China has markedly increased since the project’s inception, a fact the Canberra government acknowledged in a recent defense review, which stated that China’s rapid and stealthy military buildup means that time is no longer on Australia’s side.
Following months of speculation, including indications from government sources that it might walk away from the deal, the Australian government on Monday confirmed it had reached an “agreement in principle” with Naval Group. However, it is only an agreement to sign the deal, and the project still has many powerful critics who believe it is too expensive and the submarines would be obsolete by the time they enter service.
The issue has become a scandal in Australia, the result of prevarication and bureaucratic inertia by multiple governments. It is a story all-too familiar to Taiwanese, who have watched impotently as multiple administrations squandered precious time and money, before the current government bit the bullet and launched an indigenous submarine program.
Known as the Haichang Project, the project is to build eight domestically produced submarines at an estimated cost of more than US$16 billion, with the first vessel scheduled for completion by 2025. Despite Taiwan’s lack of submarine-building experience, the program appears to be progressing well and construction of the first vessel is under way.
This raises the question of whether Taiwan might be able to tempt Australia to come on board its submarine program, should the French deal collapse. This is not as outlandish as it might seem for several reasons:
Canberra would not be able to turn to the US for assistance, since the US submarine industry is already operating at full capacity as it seeks to level the playing field with China, which has been churning out subs like sausages over the past decade and a half.
Despite the UK’s BAE Systems having a proven design with its Astute-class hunter-killer submarine, they are nuclear-powered and Australian law prohibits the operation of nuclear reactors.
Taiwan, on the other hand, is building essentially the same type of vessel that Australia is seeking: a modern, diesel-electric-powered attack submarine. While the specifications differ — Australia’s submarines would be larger, heavier and built to endure longer missions — it could be argued that the gravity of the threat from China necessitates some compromise on capability.
Spreading the cost of the program over a larger number of hulls would significantly reduce the unit cost of each boat, benefiting both nations. Taiwan would also benefit from Australia’s experience in submarine construction, and working together on a common submarine could provide a springboard for closer cooperation between the two nations’ navies.
Taiwan should extend an invitation to Australia to inspect its submarine program, and evaluate the design for suitability and adaptation to meet the Royal Australian Navy’s requirements. The icing on the cake is that Australia would be purchasing, not selling, military equipment from Taiwan — ensuring that Canberra was in complete compliance with Beijing’s precious “one China” policy, while strengthening military ties with a friendly neighbor.
What began on Feb. 28 as a military campaign against Iran quickly became the largest energy-supply disruption in modern times. Unlike the oil crises of the 1970s, which stemmed from producer-led embargoes, US President Donald Trump is the first leader in modern history to trigger a cascading global energy crisis through direct military action. In the process, Trump has also laid bare Taiwan’s strategic and economic fragilities, offering Beijing a real-time tutorial in how to exploit them. Repairing the damage to Persian Gulf oil and gas infrastructure could take years, suggesting that elevated energy prices are likely to persist. But the most
Taiwan should reject two flawed answers to the Eswatini controversy: that diplomatic allies no longer matter, or that they must be preserved at any cost. The sustainable answer is to maintain formal diplomatic relations while redesigning development relationships around transparency, local ownership and democratic accountability. President William Lai’s (賴清德) canceled trip to Eswatini has elicited two predictable reactions in Taiwan. One camp has argued that the episode proves Taiwan must double down on support for every remaining diplomatic ally, because Beijing is tightening the screws, and formal recognition is too scarce to risk. The other says the opposite: If maintaining
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), during an interview for the podcast Lanshuan Time (蘭萱時間) released on Monday, said that a US professor had said that she deserved to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following her meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Cheng’s “journey of peace” has garnered attention from overseas and from within Taiwan. The latest My Formosa poll, conducted last week after the Cheng-Xi meeting, shows that Cheng’s approval rating is 31.5 percent, up 7.6 percentage points compared with the month before. The same poll showed that 44.5 percent of respondents
India’s semiconductor strategy is undergoing a quiet, but significant, recalibration. With the rollout of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0, New Delhi is signaling a shift away from ambition-driven leaps toward a more grounded, capability-led approach rooted in industrial realities and institutional learning. Rather than attempting to enter the most advanced nodes immediately, India has chosen to prioritize mature technologies in the 28-nanometer to 65-nanometer range. That would not be a retreat, but a strategic alignment with domestic capabilities, market demand and global supply chain gaps. The shift carries the imprimatur of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, indicating that the recalibration is