With confirmation that US President Donald Trump was indeed defeated by US president-elect Joe Biden, there is a sense that a dangerous and sensitive time has arrived for the Taiwan Strait, not knowing exactly what antics Trump might get up to that might exacerbate cross-strait tensions.
Despite the US Congress having passed several “Taiwan-friendly” laws over the past few years, the sense of relief these have created has been mitigated by a sense of fear — relief that Taiwan-US relations are improving, but fear that Sino-US relations are tanking and that Taiwan might get caught in the middle.
The Republic of China (ROC) has been sold out by the US twice before. The first and most well-known occasion was when the China White Paper was published by the US Department of State in 1949, accounting for the circumstances that led to the US’ “loss of China” and its abandonment of Taiwan.
Then there was the breaking of ties with Taiwan in 1978, causing great anxiety in the nation after it lost its most important ally overnight.
For the ROC, Taiwan-US relations are important, but Sino-US ties are also extremely important.
Moreover, one set of ties affects the other.
If Sino-US relations are tense, the ROC is between a rock and a hard place: It does not have the luxury of stepping outside the situation. The US can use Taiwan as a bargaining chip against China, and China considers Taiwan a core value, in which it would not accept US intervention.
Beijing insists that any country wanting to set up diplomatic relations with it adheres to the “one China” principle, and the US is no exception.
This is how the US can have its Taiwan Relations Act, but also have signed the Three Joint Communiques as the basis for bilateral exchanges with China, while the US’ Taiwan Travel Act, signed into law by Trump, is tantamount to a blowing a huge hole into the “one China principle.”
Beijing would not simply sit idly by and watch the situation evolve in this way without doing anything about it. It would have no choice but to respond, and respond strongly.
As far as the authorities in Beijing are concerned, it is utterly intolerable that the Taiwan Travel Act has become law, but for Taiwanese and US officials to actually meet would be something else entirely.
This grand courtesy extended to Taiwan would touch a raw nerve in cross-strait relations.
Taiwan has become a puppet of the US and has no say in the matter. How ironic.
The US’ “Taiwan-friendly” legislation is not the manna from heaven it is portrayed to be. It is the US using Taiwan to needle China.
Taiwan’s future is in the hands of others and that is the lot that Taiwanese have to contend with. The US is acting in its own interests and cares little about what fate befalls Taiwan.
Caught between the US and China, Taiwan is unable to escape its fate.
If Washington truly cared about Taiwan, it would help the nation in trade and not use it as a bargaining chip over the sensitive issue of the “one China” principle, trying to force China to sacrifice some of its trade interests and relent to US demands.
Taiwan is not a US colony, neither is it a US protectorate. It needs to have some sense of its sovereignty and independence, and the self-respect to tell the world that it desires to have cross-strait ties and relations with the US progress at the same time.
Chu Yen-kuei is a lecturer in law at National Open University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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