However the questions are phrased, opinion polls in Taiwan on cross-strait relations always result in a majority of respondents advocating maintaining the “status quo,” but what does that actually mean?
A majority of Taiwanese would broadly accept the following definition: not altering Taiwan’s democratic way of life, independence or autonomy, and retaining the right of future generations to decide the final outcome.
For many years, defending this objective has necessitated maintaining a high degree of national strength to prevent the “status quo” from being bulldozed by Beijing.
In the past, maintaining the “status quo” meant Beijing refraining from taking aggressive action, and Taipei avoiding policies that might provoke Beijing. This allowed the two sides, on the surface at least, to maintain the pretense of an unbroken “status quo.”
However, the rules of the old “status quo” have long since ceased to apply, and Beijing has lately taken to attacking the “status quo” in an attempt to reshape the wold order. The rupture of the “status quo” can be traced back to November 2013, when China unilaterally declared an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea.
That was the same year that Xi Jinping (習近平) was inaugurated as Chinese president.
Today, Beijing has not only torn up Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula, it has also taken hostile action in the Taiwan Strait, the South China and East China seas, and clashed with the Indian army on the India-China border.
China has been by flexing its military muscle all over the place and making enemies.
This is particularly the case in the Taiwan Strait, where military aircraft from China’s People’s Liberation Army have probed Taiwanese airspace dozens of times since the beginning of this year, including patrols by Xian H-6 bombers.
These “drills” have increased to a level of intensity that suggests that Beijing intends to make these intrusions into Taiwanese airspace routine.
Beijing is doing everything in its power to alter the global “status quo,” and at an increasing pace. It is doing so intentionally in the above-mentioned scenarios, and unintentionally through the export of COVID-19, which has initiated a global crisis that has caused millions to be infected and hundreds of thousands of deaths worldwide.
To maintain an equilibrium and hold on to its hegemonic position, Washington must respond to Beijing’s challenge. The US has taken the lead in the global response, redeploying air carrier groups to the South China Sea, and repeatedly dispatching reconnaissance and electronic surveillance aircraft to gather intelligence on Chinese aircraft.
On one occasion, this involved flying only 95km off the coast of Guangdong Province, a move clearly intended to intimidate Beijing.
That is the strategic picture at the macro level. Focusing in on the cross-strait situation, Taipei can no longer afford to simply register “concern” over Beijing’s provocations. Instead, the government must change with the changing security environment to maintain some semblance of a dynamic “status quo.”
This raises the question of how Taiwan should respond and what changes it needs to make.
One recent event stands out and is worth exploring. On July 6, in a video message to supporters in Taiwan to mark his 85th birthday, the Dalai Lama said that he hoped to visit Taiwan again soon. Immediately afterward, politicians from the president down were pressed by Taiwanese media to issue a response.
The Taipei-based Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued a statement that said: “If convenient, the Dalai Lama wishes to visit Taiwan. However, if Taiwan’s government has any misgivings, they will not force the issue.”
It looks as if both sides are trying to pour cold water on the idea.
Is such a reaction appropriate right now? Surely, when the government is deciding how to deal with a proposed visit by the Dalai Lama, it should not simply be concerned with perception, it should make a rational decision.
The Dalai Lama visited Taiwan in 1997, 2001 and 2009 — once during each of the administrations of former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
The background to each of those three visits was different: On each occasion the cross-strait relationship was in flux and required the government of the day to employ ingenious methods to receive the Dalai Lama. Nevertheless, irrespective of which party was in power, each president resisted pressure from Beijing to ban the Dalai Lama’s visit.
Taking that into account, President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) decision on whether to go ahead with the visit should be straight-forward.
Some might ask: Perhaps Tsai could postpone the Dalai Lama’s visit?
Showing due regard for the exiled spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, upholding human rights and respecting freedom of travel are universal values shared by democratic nations.
Looked at from a different perspective, during a speech at US think tank the Hudson Institute on July 7, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that China has been continuously interfering in US domestic politics by pressuring US officials not to visit Taiwan.
In reality, Beijing’s coercive tactics are not limited to the US, but extend to other countries, including the Czech Republic.
Then-Czech Senate president Jaroslav Kubera unexpectedly passed away in January before a planned visit to Taiwan. Kubera’s relatives maintain that a threatening message from the Chinese embassy played a part in his sudden death.
It is another example of Beijing’s strategy of isolating Taiwan from the rest of the world. It wants to hollow out the nation’s sovereignty and weaken its association with like-minded democratic nations.
If the Tsai administration’s policy is to maintain the cross-strait “status quo,” that would mean choosing to submit to Beijing’s logic. Perhaps the government has unwittingly internalized Beijing’s dogma and is applying it to its handling of “sensitive individuals” such as the Dalai Lama.
During Tsai’s first term in office, her administration hinted that the time was not right for the Dalai Lama to visit. Now into her second term in office, with the international state of affairs having changed beyond recognition, a rapacious China is knocking at Taiwan’s door.
The old “status quo” has been replaced with a new one. If the government chooses to remain passive, it will be forced to adopt countermeasures to offset the changed “status quo” at a macroscopic level.
If the Tsai administration does not open its door to a good friend now, then to whom? Welcoming the Dalai Lama on a routine visit should not be an issue at all, and Taipei does not need anyone’s permission to do so. This is the kind of “status quo” Taiwan should hold on to.
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper).
Translated by Edward Jones
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