China’s near-term deployment of a new class of maneuverable hypersonic speed missiles poses a new level of threat to Taiwan, United States forces in Asia, and those of its allies. As a credible defensive response to this threat may not be possible for many years, it is crucial that Washington deploy a deterrent response by rapidly developing its own hypersonic missiles and offering appropriate versions to allies and friends like Taiwan.
Hypersonic missile and hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) weapons pose a major threat because their high Mach 10, or ten times the speed of sound speed, combined with the ability to perform extreme maneuvers at detection-delaying lower altitudes, make them invulnerable to current missile defense systems. In addition, their very high impact speeds increase their destructive effect, though they can also be equipped with small nuclear warheads.
After decades of research, development and more recent testing, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be on the verge of deploying its first land-based medium range, missile-based, HGV-armed attack missile, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation’s (CASIC, 中國航天科工集團) DF-17 missile. Earlier versions of the HGV warhead of this missile were called DF-ZF or Wu-14.
Since 2014, DF-17 developments have been leaked by US government sources such as to Bill Gertz of The Washington Times who that year reported that early tests of the Wu-14 HGV had achieved speeds of Mach 10. In late December 2017, US sources revealed to Ankit Panda, writing in The Diplomat, that the DF-17 was based on CASIC’s 1,000km range DF-16 medium range ballistic missile. Panda reported that the DF-17’s range could be between 1,800 and 2,400km, as HGVs generate lift which extends range. It could also fly and maneuver at the “depressed” altitude of 60km, diving down from its much higher apogee.
Then in September 2018, speaking at a US Senate forum of the Alexandria, Virginia-based Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA), current US Department of Defense Undersecretary for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin revealed that China has conducted more than 30 hypersonic weapons tests.
More recently, on about June 22, 2019, CASIC revealed a brief video on a web portal connected to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controlled China Youth Daily showing computer generated graphics for a missile which could be the DF-17. Such Chinese limited information revelations about a weapon system often precede more formal revelations. Perhaps the DF-17 could make its first public appearance in the large CCP anniversary military parade this October, which would also signify that it has entered service with the PLA Rocket Force.
CASIC may also be working on sea and air-launched HGV-equipped missile systems. In August 2017, leaked university lecture slides by retired PLAN Rear Admiral Zhao Dengping (趙登平) included one showing a ship-launched anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a maneuvering warhead. Then at the November 2018 Zhuhai Airshow CASIC revealed its CM-401, the world’s first ship-launched ASBM for export.
At the 2011 Zhuhai Airshow CASIC revealed its CM-400AKG, a 900kg air-launched ballistic missile with a 280km range, and speed reported to be Mach 4 or up to Mach 5.5, which would make it a hypersonic weapon. One version is able to hit moving ships by using a passive radar that homes in on a ship’s electronic emissions. This system may also guide the larger CM-401, while the CM-400AKG is small enough to be launched from the vertical launch systems used by PLA Navy destroyers and frigates.
Though not displayed publicly on PLA attack aircraft, Asian military sources have noted the PLA is equipped with the CM-400AKG. In April 2018, US sources again revealed to Panda that the PLA is testing an estimated 3,000km range air-launched version of CASIC’s DF-21 medium range ballistic missile. Reported to have nuclear and non-nuclear warhead armed variants, a future version might also carry a maneuverable HGV warhead.
The PLA is also developing scramjet-powered hypersonic warheads, which can achieve greater range and do not lose speed as rapidly as HGVs. While the PLA has sponsored a great deal of university research on scramjets, and a shape of a possible scramjet-powered hypersonic warhead was revealed in September 2018, it is not clear when they will emerge in PLA service.
Today, anti-ballistic missile interceptors like the US Raytheon Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles that equip Taiwan’s Air Force lack the speed and maneuverability to take down HGVs maneuvering at speeds well in excess of Mach 5. Furthermore, new weapons which likely could defeat HGVs, such as lasers with sufficiently high energy, may not be available until the later 2020s.
If the PLA can be assured that its hypersonic weapons will deliver a successful “first strike,” then it may be more tempted to initiate a conflict against Taiwan, US, and other forces in Asia. Thus, as a “defensive” response to maneuvering HGVs is not available, it is necessary to instead produce a “deterrent” response. This means that the United States and its allies and friends like Taiwan must deploy their own HGV warhead-armed missiles to deter China from using theirs.
While US research and development of unpowered and powered hypersonic warheads took place under the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations, it is the Trump Administration which is now accelerating US hypersonic weapons development, perhaps spending up to US$10.5 billion over the next five years. If successful, the US Army, Navy and Air Force could be fielding hypersonic weapons by 2024.
There is some progress toward this end. American aerospace prime Northrop Grumman revealed a concept for an air-launched hypersonic attack missile at the June 2019 Paris Airshow, while Lockheed Martin revealed its air-launched hypersonic missile concept at a Washington, D.C. exhibition in May.
As the US makes progress toward fielding its hypersonic weapons, it is necessary to consider the requirements for these systems by allies and friends. For example, a Taiwanese hypersonic weapons capability may quickly become crucial for sustaining deterrence on the Taiwan Strait, allowing for more time to develop defensive weapons such as lasers.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Potomac, Maryland.
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