The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress is to take place in late October. The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP has already laid the groundwork for so-called “Xi Jinping Thought” (習近平思想) to be written into the CCP and the People’s Republic of China constitutions. One of the congress’ most important tasks will be to devote precious space within its “fourth communique” to mobilizing and preparing the groundwork for amending the two constitutions to incorporate “Xi Jinping Thought.”
The CCP constitution stipulates that: “The Communist Party of China will follow Marxist-Leninist Mao Zedong (毛澤東) Thought, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) Theory, the Three Represents and a Scientific Outlook on Development as its guiding philosophy.”
Since the 18th National Congress in 2012, when Xi was anointed as leader, under the auspices of an anti-corruption drive, he has gradually risen to a position of absolute power within the party.
Then, in October last year at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee awarded Xi the title of “Core Leader,” meaning that Xi’s thoughts on governing the country and his new ideas and stratagems would be condensed and written into the party’s constitution as “Xi Jinping Thought.”
Xi is to become China’s third leader after Mao and Deng to have his name attached to officially recognized thoughts and ideas.
In March, Liu Mingfu (劉明福), a retired colonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, gave a bombastic speech in London to promote the release of his book Why the Liberation Army Can Win in which he fired the starting gun on a movement to immortalize Xi within the CCP.
An earlier book authored by Liu, entitled China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Era, published in 2010, had a significant impact on Xi and was a source of inspiration for him. After he rose to power, the book became a best-seller and it has since been republished several times, even being translated into English in 2015 and published in the US.
In his latest book, Liu says that “Xi Jinping Thought” represents a new, “third phase,” of leadership for the party: The first being war and revolution under Mao, followed by peace and development in the Deng era.
Five years into Xi’s presidency, Liu says that the Xi era can already be defined as one of reform and innovation.
Liu says that the Chinese race has been able to overcome adversity due to profound ideas and new ways of thinking, and that the strategic thinking of Mao, Deng and now Xi are the catalysts for China’s national rejuvenation.
Last month, at the annual academic meeting of China’s national symposium on Taiwan, party-affiliated academics specializing in Taiwan used a discussion event organized by party stooges to lavish praise on Xi’s Taiwan policy and eulogize the so-called “intellectual prowess” of “Uncle Xi.”
In a June 20 article by the China Review News Agency, Beijing’s propaganda mouthpiece in Hong Kong, Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies deputy director Ni Yongjie (倪永傑) paid tribute to Xi’s ideas, in his role as leader of the Chinese Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, which Ni said has already borne fruit through “integrating the development” of Taiwan, and applauded Xi’s important contribution to thinking on the cross-strait relationship.
Nanjing University Institute of Taiwan Studies deputy director Liu Xiangping (劉相平) also lavished praise on “Xi Jinping Thought” for its positive impact in finding a practical solution to the “Taiwan problem.”
Without stirring up populist sentiment, Xi has slowly and methodically advanced the “emotional contract” that exists between the two peoples on either side of the Taiwan Strait, Liu said.
However, if Xi’s ideas and policies really are blessed with preternatural intelligence, why has his Taiwan policy failed so miserably? Furthermore, why has China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zhijun (張志軍), whose job it is to implement “Uncle Xi’s” Taiwan policy, taken early retirement?
Politburo Standing Committee member and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference chairman Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲) did not mince words when he said that “since last year, the state of affairs in Taiwan has undergone dramatic change, China is now facing a grim situation across the Taiwan Strait.”
Not only has Beijing severed relations with Taiwan’s ruling party following the election of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to government, it also fears that figures within Taiwan’s pan-blue camp, who were bought off by China in years gone by, have mostly lost influence on the political stage.
Beijing also worries that Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman-elect Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) might have “gone native” and cannot be relied upon to toe the party line. On June 18, the CCP convened a “cross-strait discussion forum,” which signified a change in direction from Beijing’s previous strategy of employing its “One Belt, One Road” strategy to lure Taiwan into its fold.
China’s new strategy is to directly take on the threat to “unification” posed by the Taiwanese electorate’s decision to vote in the DPP last year.
From warmongering members of the Chinese military who advocate a “military unification” of Taiwan, to the security officials who detained Taiwanese human rights activist Lee Ming-che (李明哲) for more than 100 days, and the blocking of Taiwan’s participation at the WHO’s World Health Assembly in May by Chinese officials: All these arbitrary acts have turned Taiwanese public opinion against China.
These officials should study Xi’s work so they can correct their ways.
The UK’s The Economist on April 2 last year published an article entitled Beware the cult of Xi, which was sharply critical of his authoritarian leadership style. It said Xi’s highly suppressive policies and accumulation of ever more personal power would not bring him security nor help him to steady the ship.
It also said that China’s elite are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with his performance.
Xi has been using the party’s thuggish investigators to tackle graft, which has often resulted in the settling of scores with political enemies rather than a fair and impartial enforcement of the law. Meanwhile, his foreign policy agenda, in particular his aggressive actions in the South China Sea, have unfortunately forced many Asian nations into the protective embrace of the US.
The article said that during the past 66 years of CCP rule in China, the most turbulent times have usually come about when infighting breaks out among the party elite: Xi’s leadership style is pouring oil on the fire. By intimidating and suppressing his political enemies, in the long run, all Xi will achieve is the creation of more opponents who might one day seek to challenge his rule.
Parris Chang is professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University and president of the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Edward Jones
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