Tue, May 10, 2016 page8

• The Liberity Times Editorial: Ma’s exercise in ‘beacon diplomacy’

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  In 2008, when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was returned to office, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) announced a foreign policy strategy that would focus on “peaceful relations with China, friendship with Japan and a close relationship with the US.” Ma was attempting to form three sets of parallel bilateral ties in order to build a new framework of military and economic security for Taiwan.

  This was based on the idea of self-preservation: that small Taiwan would only be able to survive by forming individual alliances with each of these three powerful countries.

  This year, as Ma’s term in office draws to an end, instead of taking the initiative to slowly wind down his administration, he has taken it upon himself to engage in a round of “beacon diplomacy,” something that he had previously criticized the Democratic Progressive Party for doing. Ma’s about-turn on diplomacy has already attracted the attention of several major countries.

  After the government last week dispatched a Kang Ding-class (La Fayette-class) naval frigate to protect Taiwanese fishing boats and patrol the waters surrounding the Okinotori atoll — a rocky outcrop in the East China Sea claimed by Japan — a group of former premiers and senior KMT officials flew to the disputed Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) in the South China Sea on a C-130 transport plane.

  Japan has called the former a deliberately provocative action, and it seems friendly relations with Tokyo have evaporated. As for the latter, when combined with the series of actions taken by the government following Ma’s personal visit to Itu Aba in January, it was interpreted by Washington as an overly disruptive move, and it is obvious that Taiwan no longer enjoys a close relationship with the US.

  Then, two weeks ago, Ma visited Kinmen with Vice President Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and other high-level KMT officials to unveil a monument. While the ceremony was ostensibly held in the name of peace, many observers suspect that the timing of the ceremony, organized during this period of government transition, was more about highlighting the fruits of eight years of shared policy between the KMT and Beijing, and presenting Ma’s “achievements” in office as being dependent upon the supposed key building blocks of the so-called “1992 consensus,” the 1993 Koo-Wang talks and “one China.”

  Therefore, it can be concluded that Taiwan’s relationship with China is the only bilateral relationship out of the three that still survives.

  Ma’s three sets of parallel bilateral ties have gradually morphed into an exclusive and solitary relationship with China — this is nothing less than a 180 degree policy reversal. What has happened in the space of eight years — both within Taiwan’s diplomatic environment and the inner circles of government — to have caused Taiwan’s democratically-elected government to take the significant step of undertaking a globetrotting round of “beacon diplomacy?”

  There can be only three possibilities.

  First, the conflict in the South China Sea has led to Taiwan’s sovereignty being called into question. A ruling is soon expected on the Philippine government’s lawsuit against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. In its case against China, the Philippines has used Taiwan’s effective possession of Itu Aba Island to argue that the island is in fact a “rocky outcrop.” The case lit the fuse and is the main cause of the Japan Coast Guard’s recent seizure of a Taiwanese fishing boat. The size of the Okinotori atoll is tiny compared with Itu Aba, yet Tokyo claims that it possesses a 200 nautical mile (370km) exclusive economic zone around the atoll. It is a situation tailor-made to provoke international law “specialist” Ma, and challenge his argument that Taiwan’s islets and reefs should be elevated to the status of islands.

  Second, Ma could be suffering from “end-of-office syndrome.” In the past, the US, Japan and other countries have entered into negotiations with Ma’s government. However, aside from these existing diplomatic channels between Taipei, Washington and Tokyo, the Presidential Office is seen as lacking in major figures who are able to provide both a counterbalance to Ma in addition to highlighting the inherent risks in his foreign policy.

  Ma’s emotions and personal will are now the sole driving force behind Taiwan’s foreign policy. Ma’s previous statement that both sides of the Taiwan Strait each possess sovereign territory and waters — derived from an interpretation of Chinese history — has seemingly become the basis for a second Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan, which is currently being played out in the East China Sea. Former premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) took part in last week’s jolly to Itu Aba and also holds onto fond memories of “the Motherland.” However, the realities of regional politics will inevitably come into conflict with Ma and Hau’s nationalistic hubris.

  Third, it appears that there has been a conscious choosing of sides and revealing of positions. Political observers keen on conspiracy theories believe that Ma has made a decision to forge ahead with steering Taiwan away from the US-Japanese security structure and pull the country closer to China. Ma’s motive — as the theory goes — is to carve out a space for himself once he has left office, while also to shackle president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to a predetermined path and limit the range of options available to her government.

  Therefore, Ma has spared no effort in provoking hostilities that echo Beijing’s Han Chinese call to arms to safeguard the “ancestral assets” that are the “common property” of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

  Whichever reason is the cause of Ma’s drastic shift in foreign policy — or perhaps they all are the reason for the shift — the period up until the handover of government on Friday next week is unlikely to be calm. No one wants Taiwan to be at its weakest during this time.

  From every angle, Taiwan’s crucial position is an advantage, although extremely complex. The outgoing government’s pro-China attitude, its opposition to Japan and its neglect of the US give China leverage that will not dissipate with the KMT’s retreat from government. At the very least, Tsai will have to rebuild these three parallel relationships and restore mutual trust, and this will not come without cost. China is very likely to increase the pressure on her to take a clear position on several issues, most of which will be contrary to the interests of Taiwanese.

  Ma might think that he has created a situation that he controls, but the way it has developed, he has become a pawn in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) attempts to polarize the situation. If Beijing is unhappy with Tsai’s inauguration speech and wants to take it out on Taiwan, 23 million Taiwanese will be abundantly clear on who to blame.

  Translated by Edward Jones and Perry Svensson
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