In regards to DPP Legislator Lin Cho-shui's (林濁水) column on this page today, I agree with his view on the strategic interaction among the four parties that are players in the Taiwan Strait: the hawks and doves in Beijing and the ruling and opposition camps in Taipei. Nevertheless, I would like to propose a somewhat different view on the development of cross-strait relations.
Taiwan-China relations are not a battle between two forces. Rather, they are a contest involving four parties (or even six parties, if the hawks and doves in Washington are also included). Due to the differences in their future strategies and political beliefs, it's natural for them to propose varied interpretations or strategies regarding the external environment and their opponents' intentions. Some interpretations are made to test opponents. It's also inappropriate to lump internal and external statements together. However, as the parties try to cheat or outwit others in this multiangular battle, sometimes they might misjudge the situation and let others reap profits at their expense. According to Lin's article, the opposition camp's China policy may benefit the hawks in Beijing.
As Lin is limited by his own political beliefs, however, his prediction about each party's strategic goals should not be taken as a definite conclusion. Otherwise, Taiwan's leaders may overestimate the power of the doves in Beijing when formulating the nation's China policy. For example, Lin believes that Taipei missed a good chance to force Beijing into official contacts when former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) established the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, 海基會). In fact, everyone knows that China actually tried to sell "KMT-Chinese Communist Party cooperation" at that time and refused to accept Taiwan as an sovereign state when promoting its so-called official cross-strait talks. Beijing's vicious words after Taipei's proposal of a "special state-to-state" model serve as proof of that fact.
Also, Lin believes that China has adopted a more flexible Taiwan policy over the past six months in view of today's international situation and Taiwan's election results, claiming that Beijing is giving up its "one China" principle because of a sense of shame. This analysis may have overestimated the power of the doves in Beijing.
Indeed, China's pragmatists no longer consider the DPP to be a savage beast anymore. Instead, they are actively trying to understand, interact or even cooperate with the party. Nevertheless, viewing Beijing's comments on President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) bold speech on Tatan island, China's Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesman Zhang Mingqing's (張銘清) definition of cross-strait talks as internal affairs, and the prospects for DPP officials to visit China in August, it's hard to believe that Beijing has already given up President Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) "Eight Points." To push Beijing to become more flexible, the government's constant efforts are still necessary.
Perhaps the opposition camp in Taipei is in shock over Beijing's goodwill in the past few months because it misjudged China's flexibility. However, when Taipei's ruling camp is using Beijing's flexibility to prove that its direction is correct, is it overestimating such strategic flexibility? Moreover, after Beijing has proved flexible, is the ruling camp willing to seize the opportunity brought by the flexibility? If the government is unable, or even unwilling, to seize this opportunity, its influence will never be felt outside of Taiwan. Of course, it's the ruling camp's mission to consolidate its advantages in this battle. But it is hoped that those from the ruling camp can be more careful when offering their political analyses -- for the sake of the public's long-term interests.
Chang Teng-chi is a doctoral candidate in East Asia Studies at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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