"While the Kuomintang is a rotten party, Lien Chan
Chen's remarks created a controversy for his endorsement of Lien's "one China policy," instead of Lee's "special state-to-state" scenario. Chen portrayed Lee's announcement in last July as "dangerous" to Taipei's relations with Beijing.
However, he did bring up a very important question regarding who, of the three leading candidates, would be better in dealing with future cross-strait talks. According to Chen, Lien will be "a calm and open-minded leader at the negotiating table, which would benefit the Taiwanese people."
Lien has tried to take advantage of Chen's description by reiterating that his policy of "one China with respective interpretation"
The motivation was simple -- to show that Lien himself is more experienced than his competitors in negotiating with Beijing.
To know who would be the best to handle cross-strait negotiations, more attention needs to be paid to whether the new president would earn a sufficient mandate to engage in such bilateral talks. Moreover, experience need not be a precondition for the new leader when it comes to cross-strait dialogue. Experience does not guarantee a person can do the job better.
Finally, since Beijing is the one who opposes negotiations with Taipei based on equal footing, the new president needs to be capable of winning support from most Taiwanese as well as earning the trust from China.
However, the three-way race between Lien, the DPP's Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and independent candidate James Soong (宋楚瑜) is likely to produce a "minority president" with less than 40 percent of the popular vote.
With 54 percent of popular vote from the 1996 election, Lee is the only person in the KMT who had legitimacy and courage to tell the world that Taiwan and China are two independent countries. Nevertheless, without more than 40 percent support, none of the top three would have a sufficient mandate to reach any major agreement with Beijing. What could be discussed in future exchanges will likely still be functional and technical issues such as ones related to the conditional opening of the "three links."
Second, past experience means assets as well as liabilities. The DPP's accusation that Lien will bear heavier burdens when dealing with China because the KMT has failed twice in previous talks with the Chinese Communist Party makes some sense. In the face of such an arrogant counterpart, consistency, determination and skills constitute three main elements of a successful negotiator.
Finally, for a minority president to initiate pragmatic talks with Beijing, he has to win both domestic support -- based on his capability to continue political and economic reforms and generate internal consensus on cross-strait policy -- as well as mastering the Chinese negotiating behavior and safeguarding Tai-wan's independent sovereignty.
Whomever can introduce cleaner politics to realize a substantive democracy in Taiwan and build up a more sufficient government to strengthen the island's economic competitiveness, could win enough domestic support to engage in cross-strait affairs.
To earn the trust of Beijing, the new leader needs to understand his counterpart in a more realistic manner. Scholars of Chinese political negotiation behavior have offered a linear process for Chinese political negotiations.
To establish a framework for a relationship, Chinese officials will press their counterparts at the outset of a negotiation to accept certain general principles as a way to constrain the interlocutors bargaining flexibility and to test the sincerity of his desire to develop and sustain a relationship with China. The recent white paper on Taiwan, with the threat of to use force if Taiwan delays unification talks and keeps resisting the "one country, two systems" formula were the products of such an strategic thinking.
In this sense, Chinese officials are skilled in protracting a negotiation to explore the limits of their adversary's views, flexibility and patience.
To counteract pressure from Chinese officials, Taiwan's leader must know his own bottom line. A clear sense of the objectives of a negotiation will enable him to avoid being trapped in commitments to general principles and to resist Chinese efforts to drag out a negotiation. In this regard, both Lien and Soong need to be very careful in defining the nature of the "one China" and "quasi-international relationship" concepts. Chen will have to figure out a middle way between maintaining Taiwan's de facto independence, while keeping peaceful cross-strait contacts going on.
A smart Taiwan leader should also know how to present his position in a broad framework. The Chinese seem to find it easier to compromise on specific issues if they have a sense of the broader purposes of their interlocutor in developing a relationship with China. To pursue bilateral talks on functional issues there should be a pragmatic access. Finally, the new leader can not expect a quick or easy agreement with Beijing and, most importantly, should avoid deadlines.
Given the lack of trust between Taiwan and China at the moment, any negotiations made under pressure would be contrary to long-term interests. The new leader should take into consideration the will of the Taiwanese and avoid making unnecessary concession, while at the same time, pursuing domestic consensus as the first priority.
Liu Shih-chung is deputy director of the DPP's department of international affairs.
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