This weekend's ASEAN summit produced a few notable accomplishments, such as moving up the timetable for the reduction of tariffs on intra-regional trade. The crisis in Aceh was also on the agenda, continuing the gradual erosion of the tiresome doctrine of political non-intervention.
By far the biggest headline-grabber, however, was the special invitation of the leaders of Japan, China, and South Korea to join with ASEAN in a joint declaration of the desire to form an "East Asian community." The summit cheerleaders eagerly went on about how economic integration would overcome historical distrust, and how regional unity would make Asia a "big player" on the world stage, alongside Europe and North America.
A pipe dream, if ever there was one.
It is true that the European case demonstrates what integration can accomplish. As highly skilled ASEAN diplomats reminded us, the nations of Europe historically were, if anything, even more prone to conflict than those of East Asia.
But the analogy cannot be stretched to cover East Asia. This region lacks several of the basic prerequisites that made the European project viable; without these, it is hard to see how any East Asian version could be crafted.
First, at the end of World War II, Europeans had fought until they literally could fight no more, creating a deep-seated aversion to any future conflict. Second, before even the immediate effects of the war had worn off, Western European minds were focused by the massive external threat from the Soviet Union. Third, the United States took control of all security matters through NATO, freeing the agenda for the integrationists to focus on economic and social matters. Fourth, European integration has been based on a common civilization, Latin Christendom; the resistance to include even Orthodox Christian countries, much less Muslim ones, is striking.
In the Greater East Asia on offer this weekend, none of these characteristics exist. First, the two chief historical enemies and rivals for regional leadership, Japan and China, were certainly terribly devastated in WWII; however, rather than appearing bent on making peace, Japan has displayed a cagey avoidance of war guilt while China has been gripped by a rising aggressive nationalism -- disturbingly, rather more like Europe after WWI.
When the geopolitical environment is considered, the forecast for integration becomes bleak. The East Asian region faces no external threat to override local hostilities; nor is there any security architecture to take the place of NATO. The US performs some of the same role through its alliances with Japan and certain other countries, but the primary potential foe is China. In fact, ASEAN itself was conceived as an anti-communist bloc; today, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the admission of Vietnam, the security glue holding the organization together is the Chinese threat. Indeed, at the very meeting when this grandiose scheme was being announced, China was refusing to sign even the most watered-down code of conduct in the South China Sea.
Finally, there is a gaping hole in the grand unification plan -- Taiwan. Geographically, Taiwan is located square in the middle of the proposed "community," straddling the communication lines between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Economically, Taiwan is a major player, ranking at least third in foreign investment to ASEAN. Even culturally, Taiwan is the most suitable bridge between the North and the South.
Of course, politically, ASEAN leaders decided to exclude Taiwan for fear of offending China. Which just goes to prove that such a "Sinophobic Union" can hardly be considered ready for regional cooperation.
Over the past 30 years, ASEAN has made genuine progress towards reducing tensions in Southeast Asia. Its architects should focus on that job, and leave the fantasies to others.
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
It is being said every second day: The ongoing recall campaign in Taiwan — where citizens are trying to collect enough signatures to trigger re-elections for a number of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators — is orchestrated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), or even President William Lai (賴清德) himself. The KMT makes the claim, and foreign media and analysts repeat it. However, they never show any proof — because there is not any. It is alarming how easily academics, journalists and experts toss around claims that amount to accusing a democratic government of conspiracy — without a shred of evidence. These
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
RSS