When the Iraqi who could be considered more responsible than any other for the US invasion six years ago quietly returned in March to the land his lies helped shape, Iraq was entering one of its most stable and promising phases in six years of turmoil
Rafid Ahmed Alwan — otherwise known as Curveball — slipped back into Baghdad after 10 years of exile in Germany.
Before the invasion, Curveball had become the CIA’s most valuable source on Iraq’s fictitious chemical and biological weapons program, a man who underscored the White House’s push for war through a litany of lies that later claimed the careers of the former secretary of state Colin Powell and CIA chief George Tenet.
Both were forced to admit they had gone to war partly on the word of a collaborator whom no US agency had even debriefed until one year after Baghdad fell.
Curveball was a trained chemical engineer, who had been taken straight from university to work in a division of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s intelligence services, known as division four, which dealt with the former dictator’s pet projects. That much was true. But he also harbored illusions of grandeur; a life in a new land with riches, unveiled women and a new Mercedes.
The Baghdad he returned to must have seemed almost unrecognizable. Curveball stayed with a nephew in Baghdad’s northeast who he told he was planning to return for good from Germany, which has continued to offer him sanctuary.
COLLEAGUE
The plump 42-year-old saw none of his old friends or colleagues during his visit. Had he gone near his old workplace, the Saad State Company for Housing and Construction, Curveball would have found his former colleague, Abdul Salam Jeber, at his desk.
Jeber agreed to talk for the first time about his three months in CIA custody, which he now knows were caused by Curveball, a man he barely knew, but never trusted.
Two months after Baghdad fell, Jeber was approached by his boss who told him a group of Americans wanted to meet him. At the time, the US military was scanning Iraq intensively, looking for proof of a chemical and biological weapons program. They were building their case on the word of Iraqi collaborators, who had filled in the dots when UN weapons inspectors could not.
There were about six high value informants, used by the US and the UK, none more so than Curveball.
As the ultimately fruitless search intensified, Curveball remained under the protection of his German handlers, who drip-fed reports to the CIA throughout the lead-up to the invasion and the increasingly desperate months that followed.
Their man was sticking to his story. He had provided highly detailed and technically specific information about several facilities that apparently masqueraded as agricultural plants. Jeber worked at one of them, the al-Hakem plant, southwest of Baghdad.
“They were expecting to find information about fermentation projects for bacterial weapons. I was the chief of the fermentation section of the company at the time,” he said. “I know exactly what all the facilities were used for and there was no dual purpose for any of them.
“The Americans interrogating me didn’t understand that if a project like that was to be started, a minimum of 200 people would know about it; there would be technical reports, chemical process designs, mechanical design, installation, then operation. Any one of the 800 employees in Saad Company may well have known about it,” Jeber said.
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