Following President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) official apology to the nation’s Aborigines on Aug. 1 last year, many assumed that the government would adhere to the Indigenous Peoples Basic Act (原住民族基本法) announced on Feb. 5, 2005.
However, on March 14, then-Bureau of Mining Affairs director Chu Ming-chao (朱明昭) approved an application by Asia Cement to renew its mining license near Taroko National Park for 20 years.
Chu’s retirement immediately after the approval has led to suspicions of a quid pro quo deal.
Late film director Chi Po-lin’s (齊柏林) observations of Asia Cement’s quarry in Hualien led to a public outcry over the renewal.
About 21,000 people petitioned the government to revoke the license, while environmentalists demanded that the government conduct an environmental impact assessment on the mining site and follow Article 21 of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Act.
Premier Lin Chuan (林全) ordered a review of the approval process.
On June 19, the Ministry of Economic Affairs confirmed that the license would be renewed, as it did not find anything illegal regarding the application.
Ironically, Tsai on July 14 presented a special award at Chi’s memorial service to his family for the director’s contribution to the nation.
Far Eastern Group chairman Douglas Hsu (徐旭東) on June 27 defended the quarry by saying the pit could be turned into a lake to raise fish, a point refuted by former minister of the interior Lee Hong-yuan (李鴻源), who said that artificial reservoirs can leak, which could lead to dam failure.
Naturally formed landslide dams are demolished to prevent flooding should failure occur.
Indeed, there is a Truku community near the quarry.
That Hsu has failed to consider this suggests he cares little about the environment.
Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Yang Wei-fu (楊偉甫) on July 18 said that the Indigenous Peoples Basic Act is unclear, adding that even though the government respects the law, until the legislature passes amendments to the Mining Act (礦業法), it would be difficult to enforce.
Aboriginal studies academics are well aware that since the passage of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Act, before carrying out any research on Aborigines, researchers must explain their project at a meeting and obtain a signed agreement from the people involved and submit a proposal to the research ethics committee for review.
Why was Asia Cement given special permission to skip those steps?
As several reports have said, many lawmakers believe the ministry prefers a version of the amendments to the Mining Act that is biased in favor of mining companies.
Cement production involves such issues as national land preservation, the public interest and infrastructure, which raises the question if more licenses should be issued to cement companies to satisfy domestic demand or if environmental impact assessment requirements should be stricter, mining areas restricted and exports banned. Perhaps cement should be imported? These are issues that the government must clarify, and it should let the public decide, perhaps in a referendum.
Another problem is the draft amendments to the Mining Act, which include the unfair article that allows the ministry to grant mining permission to companies when three-quarters of local residents agree.
The review process for the amendments has been slow. So far, legislators have agreed on only one amendment.
However, the budget review for the infrastructure program has already been scheduled for the third extraordinary session.
It is unknown when the legislature can finish reviewing the amendments, but Asia Cement will not stop its mining operations until some major changes have been introduced.
Andrew Cheng is a professor of psychiatry.
Translated by Tu Yu-an
In the first year of his second term, US President Donald Trump continued to shake the foundations of the liberal international order to realize his “America first” policy. However, amid an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability, the Trump administration brought some clarity to its policy toward Taiwan. As expected, bilateral trade emerged as a major priority for the new Trump administration. To secure a favorable trade deal with Taiwan, it adopted a two-pronged strategy: First, Trump accused Taiwan of “stealing” chip business from the US, indicating that if Taipei did not address Washington’s concerns in this strategic sector, it could revisit its Taiwan
The stocks of rare earth companies soared on Monday following news that the Trump administration had taken a 10 percent stake in Oklahoma mining and magnet company USA Rare Earth Inc. Such is the visible benefit enjoyed by the growing number of firms that count Uncle Sam as a shareholder. Yet recent events surrounding perhaps what is the most well-known state-picked champion, Intel Corp, exposed a major unseen cost of the federal government’s unprecedented intervention in private business: the distortion of capital markets that have underpinned US growth and innovation since its founding. Prior to Intel’s Jan. 22 call with analysts
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) challenges and ignores the international rules-based order by violating Taiwanese airspace using a high-flying drone: This incident is a multi-layered challenge, including a lawfare challenge against the First Island Chain, the US, and the world. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines lawfare as “controlling the enemy through the law or using the law to constrain the enemy.” Chen Yu-cheng (陳育正), an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, at Taiwan’s Fu Hsing Kang College (National Defense University), argues the PLA uses lawfare to create a precedent and a new de facto legal
International debate on Taiwan is obsessed with “invasion countdowns,” framing the cross-strait crisis as a matter of military timetables and political opportunity. However, the seismic political tremors surrounding Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman Zhang Youxia (張又俠) suggested that Washington and Taipei are watching the wrong clock. Beijing is constrained not by a lack of capability, but by an acute fear of regime-threatening military failure. The reported sidelining of Zhang — a combat veteran in a largely unbloodied force and long-time loyalist of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — followed a year of purges within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
RSS