Much criticism has been leveled against President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) over how he failed Taiwanese by endorsing Beijing’s “one China” policy at the summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) without the public’s consent. Regrettably, the transcript released on Monday by the Mainland Affairs Council of Ma and Xi’s closed-door meeting shows that Ma also failed as the commander-in-chief of the nation’s military.
According to the transcript, Ma told Xi that many Taiwanese are concerned about China’s military deployment against Taiwan.
“I would like to explain to Mr Xi that recent media reports of [Chinese] military exercises at the Zhurihe training base and missiles [aimed at Taiwan] have given opposition parties leverage to criticize cross-strait ties,” Ma said. “If there’s a chance, some well-intended actions by your side should help abate this sort of unnecessary criticism.”
At first glance, it was comforting to learn that the president voiced an issue that has the public concerned. However, Ma’s phrasing and the piteous tone he used had many shaking their heads in disbelief.
First, Ma was representing Taiwan; it was therefore unfitting of a president to complain about the nation’s opposition parties to outsiders, let alone shifting the responsibility by making it seem that “opposition parties” were the only ones making “noise” over the issue.
In footage aired by China’s state-run China Central Television in July of a series of exercises by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at the Zhurihe Training Base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, troops were shown sprinting into a five-story structure closely resembling the Presidential Office Building in Taipei. The PLA has also reportedly built a replica of Taichung’s Cingcyuangang Air Field in Gansu Province. The reports show without a doubt that Taiwan was the imaginary enemy in military exercises.
It is incomprehensible that an issue that threatens the nation’s security and people’s livelihoods could become a matter that gives “opposition parties leverage to criticize cross-strait ties.”
After the meeting, Ma quoted Xi as saying: “The deployments do not target Taiwan.”
Period. End of discussion.
Ma said nothing in response. He did not point out the obvious: Taiwan is the only nation in sight in the direction and range of China’s nearly 1,600 short-range missiles along its coast across the Taiwan Strait.
If, as Xi claims, the missiles are not aimed at Taiwan, what are they aimed at? Xi cannot possibly be suggesting that the missiles are targeting bluefin tuna off the coast of Pingtung County or humpback dolphins of the coast of Changhua County, can he?
China’s aggression and malice toward Taiwan are real, yet from Ma’s phrasing, it appears that China’s missiles do not concern him.
Further reducing the nation’s dignity was Ma’s tone; he came across as if he was pleading to China for grace.
Late last month, the Ministry of National Defense said in its annual National Defense Report that China has been upgrading its major weapons systems and building up the PLA as part of its goal to have a fighting force strong enough to attack Taiwan by 2020.
Assessments made by other nations, such as a US Pentagon report released in May, also said that China’s massive military modernization program is dominated by preparations for a conflict with Taiwan.
China is the one changing the cross-strait “status quo” by building up its ballistic missile numbers. It is a shame that Ma, as the nation’s commander-in-chief, at the landmark meeting not only failed to point out that fact, but also appeared to make light of the military threat.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS