A month ago, Hong Kong residents launched the Occupy Central movement in their quest for universal suffrage in the 2017 elections. Although there has been dialogue between the territory’s government and student representatives, agreement has been elusive and it almost seems as if the civil protest movement and the occupation of Hong Kong’s streets could become permanent.
It thus seems as if this tug-of-war between those who support universal values and the government’s “election system with Chinese characteristics” will continue for a long time, and no one can predict the outcome.
At the broadcast public dialogue which took place on Tuesday last week, five representatives of the student alliance declared that Hong Kongers have a legitimate right to elect their chief executive in free elections.
Representatives of the Hong Kong government had no choice but to repeat the resolution adopted by China’s National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee, unable to overturn it. Their statements were neither reasonable nor forceful, and could not convince the people.
Since they could not even convince people that their stance was reasonable, the Hong Kong government is now forced to resort to a strategy of procrastination in the hope that the Occupy Central movement will die out of itself, while the government relies on the police force to remove protesters and even makes use of organized crime and groups opposed to the Occupy Central movement to incite violent clashes.
The government has also put pressure on media outlets supporting the Occupy Central movement, doing all it can to undermine the movement and force through Beijing’s uncompromising instructions.
However, a survey by the Chinese University of Hong Kong shows that support for the movement is growing steadily, and that among respondents between the ages of 15 and 25, a mere 7.7 percent were opposed to the movement. This implies that the young generation of Hong Kongers have internalized the demand for universal suffrage and the implementation of democracy, making it their highest value.
The significance of the ongoing civil movement is that it has initiated a generational shift in Hong Kong, and if the governments in Beijing and Hong Kong continue to do as they wish while ignoring other opinions, there will be more occupations and protests than they can handle.
In short, the policymakers in Beijing not only underestimated the will and determination of Hong Kong’s civil society to push for universal suffrage in the chief executive election, they also failed to see that so many people would be brave enough to take to the streets in protest and fearlessly engage in trench warfare and guerrilla warfare with the much better-equipped police force.
Most important of all, Beijing’s outrageous attitude has disappointed the public, and the collapse of Hong Kong governance is becoming more obvious every day as a crack in the centralized Chinese government’s armor appears.
Who knows? Maybe Hong Kong’s struggle for democracy will set off a butterfly effect and result in a new democratization movement. Perhaps the fourth wave of democracy is about to be unleashed.
Ku Chung-hwa is director of the New School for Democracy.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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