The US’ pivot to Asia essentially has two components: one, economic and two, security.
The US hopes the economic component can be achieved through the successful completion of the US-spearheaded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Despite deployment of more US military resources to the Asia-Pacific, achievement of the security component requires regional partners to share more of the defense burden.
Given the US’ and Taiwan’s shared values, long history of close cooperation, mutual economic interests and similar strategic interests, Taiwan should become a member of the TPP and have a more significant role in the pivot.
Taiwan is already a full member of the WTO and APEC. And it maintains close relations with 12 members of the prospective TPP who contribute 35 percent to the nation’s total trade.
As a partnership member, its economy would be the sixth-largest among TPP members. Taiwan has the 18th-largest economy in the world. The nation already plays a leading role in the Asian and global supply chain for electronics, information technology, bio-technology, auto parts and others. Its participation in the TPP would bring more stability, coordination and efficiency to supply chains in the Asia-Pacific region.
However, what is hindering Taiwan’s participation in the TPP is the nation’s lingering protectionism, especially referring to the barring of the import of US pork treated with the additive ractopamine. Taiwan sees such pork as constituting a health hazard; the US sees it as protectionism.
There is also concern in the US over trade barriers in government procurement, limitations on foreign investment and protection of intellectual property rights.
The Brookings Institute’s Center for East Asian Policy Studies chairman Richard Bush, a former American Institute in Taiwan chairman, recently commented in an interview with the Chinese-language CommonWealth Magazine that Taiwan’s economy needs to “open up.”
Providing that Taiwan does open up, the US should facilitate Taiwan’s entry into the TPP.
Achieving membership in the TPP would reduce the nation’s economic dependence on China, which the Sunflower movement proved was a concern of both student protesters and the public.
As it should have been, much attention was given to China’s participation in the recently concluded Rim of the Pacific Exercises. Yet, one wonders that given the long term, close US-Taiwan relationship and the country’s exclusion from the exercise, just what is Taiwan’s geostrategic importance in the Asia-Pacific region? Put another way, just what is Taiwan’s role in the US’ pivot to Asia?
The US needs to overcome division in Washington between the Department of Defense, Department of State and National Security Council to acknowledge Taiwan’s geostrategic importance. And Taiwan needs to give far more attention to military readiness to secure a role in the pivot.
China clearly sees the geostrategic significance of Taiwan. Control of Taiwan would give it naval reach into the Western Pacific, potentially enabling it to dominate the “first island chain” — Japan’s southwestern islands, some of which are also claimed by Taipei; Taiwan; and the northern Philippines — and to impede freedom of navigation, which is a key US concern.
Taiwan’s Leshan radar station is reportedly the most sophisticated in the world and allows early detection of Chinese missiles. As such, it offers a potential advantage to the US. As does the US National Security Agency listening post in Taiwan and intelligence-sharing with Taiwan.
Given its geostrategic importance, Taiwan needs a clearly defined security role in the US pivot to Asia. However, Deputy Minister of National Defense Andrew Hsia’s (夏立言) visit to Washington in April to clarify such a role yielded little.
Yet, Hsia must have realized there are factors about Taiwan’s military which concern US analysts and policymakers. For instance, the nation’s defense spending falls short of the 3 percent of GDP that the US has been urging it to achieve.
Many Taiwanese have been lulled into a false sense of security, rationalizing that with the improvement in cross-strait relations they have no reason to believe that China might one day attack the nation; therefore, they do not support additional military expenditure.
Taiwan’s transformation from a conscription-based military to a volunteer force is proceeding very poorly. While Taiwan has a huge number of reserves who are supposed to train annually, many do not.
Worse yet, according to a retired Taiwanese flag officer, it is unlikely that Taiwan could equip all reserves while either training or when activated. Until recently the annual Han Kuang training exercise was largely conducted using computer simulations. The Han Kuang drills need more live-fire exercises.
The ultimate defense of the nation is dependent on both Taiwan and the US, given the US’ security assurances to the nation under the Taiwan Relations Act. To ensure the greatest utility and efficiency in operating together there needs to be more active Taiwan-US training. Addressing US concerns about its military and with joint training, Taiwan might well achieve a clearer role in the pivot.
Both Taiwan and the US need to stand by their values to enhance their economies and to ensure their security interests, while being less concerned about upsetting China.
William Sharp is president of Sharp Research and Translation, LLC.
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