In the run up to the Dragon Boat Festival, Council of Agriculture Minister Chen Bao-ji (陳保基) made an odd proposal, saying that people should try other dishes, such as eggplant, if they think “zongzi” — glutinous rice dumplings wrapped in bamboo leaves and traditionally eaten during the Dragon Boat Festival — are too expensive.
On May 27, some of the “political elite” made another odd proposal when they proposed “five principles for handling the cross-strait issue.” With this masterpiece, they are attempting to convince Taiwanese that we should try their “broad one China framework” if we think that the price of Beijing’s “one China” principle is too high.
Former premier Sean Chen (陳?) said some Taiwanese are afraid of any big changes because they have read too many fairy tales, but that is not the reason we are afraid of the “broad one China framework.” Instead, we are afraid because the big, bad wolf, China, wants to eat Taiwan as if it were Little Red Riding Hood: “You’re so big, I’m so scared.”
First, according to the “broad one China framework,” the “status quo” is that the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have coexisted since 1949 and during this time the relationship between the two has changed from being “belligerent governments” to being “divided governments.”
However, although Taiwan has given up its attempts to conquer China, China has not given up the option of annexing Taiwan by military force. It even passed the “Anti-Secession Law” (反分裂國家法) to provide a legal basis for military action against Taiwan.
As to the “divided governments,” that is nothing but a fantasy of the political elite. China has never regarded Taiwan as part of a divided government, but rather as a renegade province.
Beijing always draws the attention of the international community to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated in an official letter that in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, the UN considers “Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China [PRC].”
Beijing has “arranged it” that the nation can only can take part in international organizations as an observer under the name of “Chinese Taipei” — as if it were an attendant of China’s.
Next, the political elite proposed that Taiwan and China form an incomplete “international legal entity” with more power than either the ROC or the PRC separately, to handle issues that concern both, based on consensus, as a temporary measure during the current stage of cross-strait development.
Don’t they know that if we recognize the “broad one China framework,” regardless of any “incomplete international legal entity,” the PRC is still the sole legal government recognized by the international community?
The “one China” principle is just a byword for the PRC, this is the reality of the situation. Is this temporary measure intended to be in place until Taiwan has been annexed by China or until it has become independent? Is a “broader one China” a Taiwanese dream or a Chinese dream?
Furthermore, the most laughable aspect of the “broad one China framework” is that both Taiwan and China would commit not to resort to military force or to sign any agreement on military cooperation with other countries which would be unfavorable to the other party.
China has more than 1,000 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan and is capable of destroying the nation completely. Why would it need to sign an agreement on military cooperation with another country if it wanted to attack Taiwan?
Instead, after the nation’s defense capacity had been eroded by President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, the only result would be that Taiwan lost international support. The Taiwan Relations Act would have to be scrapped and Taiwan would become the prey of China and the Taiwan Strait would become Chinese territory
The signing of military cooperation agreements leaves room for the imagination. One cannot help but be curious what vision for the nation’s future Taiwanese political elites really have.
Finally, and regrettably, when this elite was coming up with their “broad one China framework,” they seem to have ignored the fact that Taiwan is a democracy — that the public are the masters of the nation and have the final say. In order to implement the “broad one China framework,” two domestic reforms would be required.
First, the Constitution would have to be amended to increase the number of legislative seats so as to reflect public opinion, rather than distorting the democratic system as the current system does by not valuing all votes equally.
Second, the Referendum Act (公民投票法) would have to be amended in order to lower the quorum threshold. For major national policies, especially a possible change to the “status quo,” the public must have the right to the final decision.
We do not allow political parties to engage in closed-door politics inside the governmental system, nor do we allow political elites to intervene from outside the system, because such intervention could allow China to ignore the 23 million Taiwanese and decide our future for us directly.
The “broad one China framework” must be put to the test, but it looks very similar to Beijing’s “one China principle.” During Ma’s rule over the past six years, the blind spots in some politicians’ thinking about cross-strait relations have been worrisome.
Faced with a China that is bent on hegemony and determined to annex Taiwan, those politicians have failed to show a strong will to consolidate the public’s national identity; instead, they have constantly sought political terms and compromises acceptable to Beijing.
In other words, they keep retreating while China doesn’t move an inch. As they retreat, they gradually deviate from the nation’s interests and move toward China’s. Past experience shows that such political elites are eliminated by smart voters.
So what will happen to the political elite that is behind the “broad one-China framework?”
We will just have to wait and see.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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