Wrong TRA message sent?
Two weeks ago, the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held a hearing called “Evaluating US Policy on the 35th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).”
Those who know the basic tenets that shape US-Taiwan relations understand that these hearings typically consist of two primary (and for the most part, predictable) themes:
Members of the US Congress proclaiming their unwavering support for Taiwan and its democracy, and when called to testify, staff from Foggy Bottom read out pre-cleared talking points, many of which seemingly have not been updated since the act’s implementation in 1979.
The aforementioned hearing was on its way to repeating this pattern before ranking committee member US Senator Marco Rubio asked US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel: “Does the [US President Barack] Obama Administration remain committed to [former] president [Ronald] Reagan’s so-called ‘six assurances’ to Taiwan? Is that still our position?”
Unlike Russel’s predecessor, Kurt Campbell, who in a 2011 US House of Representatives hearing on Taiwan reiterated repeatedly that “the United States abides by the so-called six assurances,” Russel only confirmed that the assurances were “an element” of Washington’s approach to Taiwan relations.
Russel’s answer was troubling on a number of levels, since even subtle changes in wording from the US Department of State on Washington’s official “unofficial” relationship with Taipei could have far-reaching ramifications.
In a relationship often clouded by US ambiguity, the six assurances have not only helped give Taiwanese government officials a certain level of clarification and certainty; they have also shown other countries that the US can be counted on as a reliable and committed partner within a bilateral relationship framework.
However, perhaps just as important is whether Beijing perceives Russel’s testimony as a subtle, yet clear change in Washington’s Taiwan policy — a potentially inaccurate perception that could lead China to miscalculate on how to approach its relationship with Taiwan, as well as the US.
China experts have long said that Beijing gives documents such as the three US-China joint communiques and agreements of intent such as Cairo Declaration of 1943 a much higher level of importance than many other countries (albeit primarily when such documents suit its official narrative).
While some experts may deem a potential alteration or downgrading of a policy such as the six assurances as being of rather low importance, Beijing undoubtedly sees it the other way.
It is worth repeating that Russel’s testimony last week does not mean that there has been a shift in US policy toward Taiwan, but it could be interpreted that way and therein lies the problem.
Brian Benedictus
Falls Church, Virginia
Phase out nuclear power
A statement issued by Academia Sinica and signed by the institute’s dean, deputy dean and 23 academics has urged the government to hold a referendum on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant in New Taipei City’s Gongliao District (貢寮).
Several facts mentioned in the statement deserve consideration: The first is that Taiwan houses six of the world’s 12 high-risk nuclear reactors in earthquake-prone areas.
In addition, it ranks second in terms of the population density of the areas around these reactors and becomes No. 1 if population density is measured per unit of habitable land.
Furthermore, Taiwan is targeted by 1,600 Chinese missiles. Given these facts, it is not an exaggeration to say that Taiwan has one of the highest, if not the highest, risk of suffering a nuclear disaster.
The nation no longer has space in which to store nuclear waste and shipping it overseas to North Korea and China is not a reliable solution. Understandably, the Aborigines on Orchid Island refuse to accept any more atomic waste, some of which has also been secretly stored in Taoyuan County’s Longtan Township (龍潭).
Only 8.3 percent of the energy used by the nation is generated by nuclear power. Through all-out conservation and efficient combustion, including preheating combustion air with flue gas and combustion air oxygen enrichment, atomic power can be phased out.
Taiwan emits 11.3 tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita per year, compared with the global average of 4.5 tonnes. Taiwanese’s per capita income is lower than that of Japanese and Europeans, yet Taiwan manages to have higher carbon dioxide emissions than Japan or Europe. This means that a lot of energy must be being wasted.
Using natural gas or liquefied natural gas instead of coal or oil is an effective way to reduce emissions, so converting the Gongliao plant to a natural gas-fired facility would help cut the nation’s carbon footprint while meeting its energy needs. Solar and geothermal energy should be developed concurrently.
The Fourth Nuclear Power Plant’s fate is a technical rather than political issue. The Executive Yuan needs to promptly make a wise decision based on the high risk of a nuclear disaster and finding a feasible solution for Taiwan’s energy problems.
Charles Hong
Columbus, Ohio
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
For Taiwan, the ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets are a warning signal: When a major power stretches the boundaries of self-defense, smaller states feel the tremors first. Taiwan’s security rests on two pillars: US deterrence and the credibility of international law. The first deters coercion from China. The second legitimizes Taiwan’s place in the international community. One is material. The other is moral. Both are indispensable. Under the UN Charter, force is lawful only in response to an armed attack or with UN Security Council authorization. Even pre-emptive self-defense — long debated — requires a demonstrably imminent
RSS