The picture of power politics in East Asia has become murkier than ever. Two conflicting views about the region’s future have emerged and foreshadow completely different courses of development.
One group of analysts holds a pessimistic view that compares current Sino-US relations to the rivalry between Britain and Germany prior to World War I. They say that the possibility of catastrophic consequence is real given disturbing similarities between the two situations. This group proclaims that if tensions between China and its neighbors are not correctly managed by the US, disaster may be unavoidable.
This provocative analogy has drawn much attention because it was cited by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his speech at the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, last month. He said that Japan and China should not repeat the mistakes that Britain and Germany made in the years leading up to World War I. The two European powers were unable to avoid war despite high levels of economic interdependence, a relationship he said was like the economic ties between Japan and China.
The other analogy was used by Philippine President Benigno Aquino III earlier this month, when he likened China’s claim to disputed islands in the South China Sea to Germany’s expansionist ideals before World War II and called for world leaders not to make the mistake of appeasing China as the West did with Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.
Apparently, these historical analogies are deliberately targeted at China by two anxious states that have territorial disputes with Beijing. Whether their motivation is to address their concerns over China’s recent military assertiveness by seeking more international support or merely to reveal their deep-rooted apprehension over feasible military conflict with Beijing, what they have in common is to perceive China’s latest muscle-flexing as a substantial and coercive threat to their national security that poses a high likelihood of triggering a war.
Another school of thought, espoused by Harvard University professor and former US Department of Defense assistant secretary Joseph Nye, dismisses any analogy to the world wars. Nye said that it was misleading to compare the situations because the nuclear deterrent is an effective antidote to leaders making decisions that might risk military escalation. Furthermore, there is no explicit and severe ideological confrontation between China and the US. Conversely, there exist plenty of strong incentives for the two powers to cooperate, including on energy issues and climate change. He said that the US leads China in overall military strength, economic capabilities and soft power.
The US’ unfaltering and invincible advantages make China more reluctant to take adventurous action, Nye said.
In contrast to the warnings of conflict, the first formal visit of Mainland Affairs Council Minister Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) to China and his meeting with China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) this month drew worldwide media attention. The visit signified the peak of reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came to power in 2008.
Despite the trip being more symbolic than indicating substantive progress, it is laudable that Wang was able to advocate the value of Taiwan’s democracy in his speech at Nanjing University. This seemingly historical breakthrough was largely built on the political calculations of the two governments.
Obviously, China is striving to aggrandize its influence over Taiwan by urging it to sign economic agreements and possible political settlements before the 2016 presidential election. For Taiwan’s part, the Ma administration — suffering from a low approval rating and stagnating economic growth — was hoping that a breakthrough with China could help boosting its domestic support.
While Ma would like to anchor his historical status by setting up a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jingping (習近平) at this year’s APEC leaders’ summit, this proposal was bluntly rejected by Beijing officials, indicating the limits of China’s goodwill toward Taipei.
This is indicative of the bewildering puzzle of power games in East Asia, with the coexistence of a growing shadow of military tension among regional powers and an astonishing political reconciliation between two enduring rivals. Is it unavoidable that the rise of China will eventually lead to regional conflicts, since it will definitely alter the “status quo” in the region?
To piece this puzzle together, it is critical to clarify the roles of relevant states and their interests in this power struggle. The rise of China is a game changer for East Asia’s political structure. With its astounding economic progress and military mighty, Chinese leaders feel that Beijing is entitled to regain its past glory and to defend its sovereign claims with more concrete action.
As a result, Beijing has adopted an incremental strategy, or creeping aggression in the eyes of its neighbors, to expand and enforce its sphere of influence. The measures, such as its unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea and dispatching China’s first aircraft carrier to the South China Sea, are strategies to gradually reinforce its territorial claims with the means of legal and naval military projection.
It seems reasonable to say that Beijing’s intention is to be a regional power and that it has no identifiable intention to challenge Washington’s global dominance. Nonetheless, China’s goal to regain its awesome and central status in the region will inevitably collide with the interests of the US and its allies.
The new generation of Chinese leaders tend to be more self-assured than their precedents. Likewise, young military hawks are more inclined to show off their newly advanced weapons in the name of defending sovereign integrity. As mutual trust remains weak and fragile between China and its neighbors, any Chinese military action is likely to be perceived as a provocation. If Japan and the Philippines are unwilling to back down on their sovereignty claims, their remaining option is to adopt a balancing strategy by bolstering military preparedness or by seeking foreign assistance.
Tokyo’s recent moves to increase its military deployments and its efforts to reinterpret the definition of its right to a defensive military force are vivid examples of this strategic shift. Furthermore, Japan tactically allied itself with the Philippines by loaning 10 patrol ships to the Philippine Coast Guard last year, which fortified a joint front against China.
As a relatively small state, it is sensible for Manila to rely on US military backup rather than to depend on its own defense forces. That is why the Philippines has actively facilitated its military cooperation with Washington to take advantage of US military engagements in the region to deter China’s further aggression in the South China Sea.
However, the vulnerability of this strategy lies in whether the US is a trustworthy ally. To what extent will Washington fulfill its promises and commitments with the risk of directly confronting China? For those states relying on US military deterrents to maintain regional peace and stability, their security hinges on the US honoring its agreements. With the relative decline of US power, the risk of being abandoned is always possible. So it is no surprise that so many Asian states are paying close attention to US President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia.”
For the US, as an ultimate defender of the existing order in East Asia, it is in its best interest to sustain the “status quo” with its persistent supremacy in the region. However, if China’s rise is irreversible, the secondary strategy would be to manage its growing influence within US-defined boundaries and accommodate its new role without provoking any military clashes.
Ostensibly, Washington has adopted the latter option and has endeavored to engage China through institutional channels, such as the 2009 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to prevent misunderstanding and facilitate mutual trust.
However, with China’s latest military assertiveness and Japan’s right-leaning approach, provocative rhetoric in diplomatic spats between the two could easily flare up into a real fight.
So the US faces two challenges: The first is how to convince China not to take any action that crosses lines defined by the US. The second is how to dissuade its allies not to adopt any measure that might irritate China and to persuade them to believe the US’ security commitments. To maintain this delicate balance, the US sent a harsh warning to China and asked it not to declare the air defense identification zone in the South China Sea. However, Washington also issued a rare admonition that criticized Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which it said unnecessarily stirred up regional tensions.
To ensure the success of this dual-deterrence strategy, the US has to demonstrate its determination by deploying sufficient troops in East Asia that could prevail over any Chinaese challenge to the regional “status quo” and to boost its allies’ confidence.
However, due to domestic political turmoil, Obama’s “pivot to Asia” has been widely perceived as half-hearted, not only because of his failure to visit Asia and his Asian allies for two consecutive years, but also because of US inaction in the Syrian civil war.
Obama’s Asia trip scheduled for April is critical to restore US prestige in the region. His visit will provide a chance to assess whether Washington is still perceived as a prominent player in East Asia. Although it is too early to judge what Obama might achieve, some patterns are not always as elusive and indistinguishable as they may appear.
Despite there being nothing inevitable about an outbreak of conflict in East Asia and no fundamentally incompatible interests that divide major powers, the real risk comes from mounting distrust and a growing perception of mutual enmity between China and the US’ allies. If no effective measures are taken to tone down this malignant perception, antagonistic sentiment may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Although war is not inevitable, East Asia is at risk of conflict. Without prudent management and self-restraint, a spark could still easily trigger an unwanted catastrophe.
Eric Chiou is an assistant professor at National Chiao Tung University.
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