The nation’s main political parties are gearing up for the January presidential and legislative elections. Even though many have witnessed the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government’s rampant use of the judicial process to criminalize opposition leaders, the people of this young democracy should be congratulated for having arrived at the final phase of the presidential term and being able to yet again decide on a national leader through the popular vote.
Cross-strait policy was the focal point in the previous presidential elections. However, the Democratic Progressive Party has decided to campaign on the platforms of social justice, unemployment, welfare and other social and economic issues to highlight the government’s inability to address these issues. Nevertheless, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) considered relations with China as more advantageous to his election chances and decided to set the debate on cross-strait ties by introducing a possible peace agreement with China in his platform.
This action has certainly turned the campaign spotlight back onto the issue. Peace is a universal value and is at the heart of the UN Charter. When, and if, Taiwan and China can reach peace with one other, it should be welcomed by both Taiwanese and the international community. Nevertheless, the concept of a cross-strait peace agreement as proposed by Ma and China contains major problems that cannot be ignored.
China has clearly expressed its view on the resolution of the “Taiwan problem” in the roadmap laid down by Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in his six-point statement at the end of 2008.
In the roadmap, Hu said that the two sides should, based on the “one China” principle, negotiate the formal end of the civil war and sign a peace agreement. The two sides could then discuss the political framework before unification as well as the issue of mutual military trust.
According to this roadmap, the “one China” principle and a formal end of the civil war become preconditions for a peace agreement. Apparently, the result of the peace agreement will be unidirectional: Taiwan neutralized and on the irreversible road to unification.
Ma has neither repudiated China’s method of resolving the Taiwan issue nor explained his position on the “one China” principle or the ending of the civil war as preconditions for talks on a peace agreement. In fact, he asserted that he saw genuine goodwill in the six-point statement in a video conference in April 2009.
This has left much room for speculation that he has accepted the preconditions and China’s plan for engaging in political talks. However, this is the center of much nervousness on the “one China” issue and can be taken to mean that Taiwan is part of China. Without the position cleared up, Taiwan may have its de facto independent status altered when going into negotiations.
However, if Taiwan is to be part of China, it should be the result of the talks instead of a precondition. Many Taiwanese are concerned to see that the Ma administration takes no position when China claims internationally that Taiwan is part of China.
Ending the civil war is another serious problem that needs to be scrutinized. Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) terminated the emergency decree in 1991. If Ma wants to send the country back to the pre-1991 years and recognize that the two parties are still engaged in a civil war, ending it means that the two parts will come together again.
For countries that have a stake in maintaining the cross-strait “status quo,” the impact of such negotiations and the follow-up peace agreement on the regional strategic environment would be considerable. Without notifying and consulting Taiwan’s key international partners, such as the US and Japan, the surprise announcement of the potential pursuit of a peace agreement with China is simply reckless.
China has already placed great pressure on the US regarding the sale of defense weapons to Taiwan.
One inevitable result of a formal end of the civil war and a peace agreement would be that the foundation for such security cooperation would no longer exist, as Taiwan would have become part of China. Similarly, the foundation for the Taiwan Relations Act would no longer exist.
China’s record of following through on agreements has been questionable. Exiled Tibetans continue to remind us of the outcome of their “peace agreement” with China in 1951: It invited the Chinese invasion and a massacre. Peace is easy; it can be reached if China renounces the use of force in accordance with the UN Charter.
Cross-strait policies have been divisive and often controversial in Taiwan. A national leader should enter into a consensus-building process domestically before any political talks with China.
Unfortunately, Ma’s policy-making style is the opposite of this and has further divided and consequently weakened Taiwan.
Joseph Wu is former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and former representative to the US.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰) are expected to meet this month in Paris to prepare for a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). According to media reports, the two sides would discuss issues such as the potential purchase of Boeing aircraft by China, increasing imports of US soybeans and the latest impacts of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. However, recent US military action against Iran has added uncertainty to the Trump-Xi summit. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) called the joint US-Israeli airstrikes and the
RSS