Over the last couple of weeks the disputed Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) and Taiping Island (太平島) (one of the Spratly or Nansha Islands in the South China Sea) have been focal points of numerous news reports. This comes not long after Japan’s claim to the Okinotori coral reefs in the Pacific Ocean provoked protests from various countries in Southeast Asia. I would like to draw our government’s attention to some contradictory aspects of Taiwan’s claims and to call for fresh consideration of our claim over the Spratlys.
One of the main arguments presented by Taiwan in its claim over the Diaoyutai Islands is based on the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which was signed at the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. The Diaoyutais lie atop the continuous continental shelf extending from our own coast out across the East China Sea, while they are divided from Okinawa and other Japanese islands by the 2,700m-deep Okinawa Trough.
Japan’s claim over the Okinotori coral reefs affects the interests of fishermen from various Southeast Asian countries, whose governments all oppose Japan’s claim. Since Taiwanese fishing boats also frequent the seas around the Okinotori reefs, Taiwan should naturally also voice its opposition. The grounds on which these countries argue against Japan’s claim are that, although the surface of the Okinatori coral reefs are close to sea level, most of them are submerged at high tide, leaving only two bits of reef a few meters across protruding out of the water. It is argued that this means they cannot be called islands and therefore nobody can claim them.
Let us consider the Spratly Islands on the same basis. Taiwan’s claim over the Spratlys has traditionally been delimited by a U-shaped line. Although there is a long and impressive-sounding list of over 200 islands, reefs, sands, banks and shoals that lie within this boundary, only about 15 of them, including Taiping and Jhongye(中業島) islands, remain above the sea at high tide and so can really be called islands.
The countries currently occupying these reefs can mostly only maintain a precarious presence, using structures built on stilts. It is doubtful whether these reefs can meet the standards of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, which rules that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
In fact the status of many of these marine features is even more shaky than that of the Okinotori coral reefs.
For example many of those called “banks” lie more than 10m below sea level, while those called “shoals” may be dozens of meters below the surface.
If we oppose Japan’s territorial claim over the Okinotori coral reefs, shouldn’t we, by the same measure, also reconsider some aspects of our country’s territorial claim over the Spratlys?
There is a further issue regarding the southernmost formations among the Spratlys to which our country lays claim, including Sterra Blanca (Zhengping Reef), Herald (Haining) Reef, James (Zengmu) Shoal and a few other shoals. Setting aside the fact that these reefs and shoals are submerged at various depths, from the point of view of seafloor topography and geology, they are clearly located on the continental shelf that extends outward from Malaysia and Brunei.
If we don’t accept those two countries’ claims based on the Convention on the Continental Shelf, how can we justly use the same continental shelf principle to defend our claim over the Diaoyutais?
The Diaoyutais and the Okinotori coral reefs clearly have a much greater significance for Taiwan than the far-flung James Shoal. The reality of the international situation is that Taiwan is in no position to reclaim those islands and shoals in the Spratlys that are currently occupied by China, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries.
Nevertheless, the fact that Taiwan has long maintained a base on Taiping Island, the biggest island in the Spratlys, is a useful bargaining chip that may well allow us to take part in talks concerning disputes about sovereignty over the Spratlys and exploitation of the area’s resources as countries bordering the South China Sea step up their efforts to develop those resources.
I suggest that, when opportunities arise to take part in international negotiations, Taiwan should shift away from the unrealistic U-shaped maritime border, the legal basis of which is rather doubtful.
We should also drop our territorial claims over those reefs, banks, sands and shoals that do not meet the definition of islands, while for the same reason opposing other countries’ claims over these formations. We should call on every country involved to demolish all stilt-mounted structures they have built and withdraw from all reefs and sands in the area, other than the 15 proper islands.
Of course we should also respect the maritime territorial claims of Malaysia and Brunei over their extended continental shelf. Such an approach would simplify the issue by limiting disputes to 15 or so proper islands, while enhancing the advantage that having control over Taiping Island gives to Taiwan. Most importantly, it would lend justification to Taiwan’s claim over the Diaoyutais based on the continental shelf principle, and to our position that the Okinotori coral reefs do not meet the definition of an island.
Gong Shou-yeh is associate curator of geology at the National Museum of Natural Science.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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