In the run up to the second anniversary of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) inauguration, it’s time to reflect, in the realm of cross-strait relations, on his achievements, what sort of leadership he has built, what political tools he has used to implement his policies, as well as the risks associated with his policy implementation.
To promote the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China, Ma characterized the period of governance under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as “eight lost years” in his recent debate with DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Such an allegation, together with the accusation of the DPP’s “closed-door” policy toward China, was invalid and politically misleading.
While the DPP government cemented the notion of “Taiwan identity” on the domestic front, substantial cross-strait economic and functional exchanges nevertheless continued. Taiwan’s reliance on trade with China even reached 40 percent, exceeding Japan and South Korea. Most of the negotiations and groundwork on direct cross-strait charter flights and tourism were conducted by the DPP government.
The average economic growth rate during the DPP’s eight years of governance reached 4.44 percent, while Ma’s first two years has seen minus 0.91 percent “growth.” The average unemployment rate under the DPP administration was 4.28 percent; that number goes up to 5.35 percent in Ma’s first two years.
Since taking office, Ma has placed priority on cross-strait policy above diplomatic policy and international trade policy. He has resorted to a rapid China-centric course that plays down Taiwan’s sovereignty or tentatively broaches “the sovereignty of the Republic of China,” while lacking a hedging policy toward China.
His administration has also been characterized by a lack of transparency in its decision-making. He has revived the so-called “1992 consensus,” proposed that Taiwan and China observe a policy of mutual non-denial, called for a diplomatic “truce” and defined cross-strait relations as “region-to-region” relations under the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China.
On the premise of maintaining the “status quo,” Ma has pledged a “three noes” policy of “no independence, no unification and no use of force.” However, it cannot be denied that cross-strait tension has eased and that dialogue has resumed. So far, 12 agreements have been signed following negotiations between the Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. Negotiations for an ECFA are also under way with Ma declaring that the pact will be signed next month.
These developments fulfill the international community’s hope for continued peaceful dialogue across the Strait, but at the same time they have widened domestic dispute on Ma’s China policy.
Ma could and should have used the 58 percent of popular votes he garnered in the 2008 presidential election, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) control of the administration and its legislative majority to forge a consensus in Taiwan on cross-strait policy. Unfortunately, he has neither had the intention nor the ability to do so. Instead, he has deliberately fast-tracked his China-centric policy.
If it wasn’t for continued pressure from the opposition parties and civic groups during the past year, the KMT’s setbacks in local elections over the last six months and Ma’s plummeting approval ratings, we would still be waiting on him to explain his policy on an ECFA and to willingly participate in a debate with the opposition. Even though the Ma administration only recently pro forma opened dialogue with the public, it relies more on a top-down approach, packaging public support for an ECFA with a propaganda campaign.
Beijing is fully aware that Ma is eager to build a track record of cross-strait achievements as the basis for a re-election bid in 2012. Based on the six points that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) proposed on Dec. 31, 2008, Beijing thus uses the “one China” principle and reunification to set the tone for cooperation with the Ma government to promote the following objectives: Ending political confrontation between the two sides; signing a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement; establishing military confidence-building mechanisms; and allowing Taiwan to participate in events by international organizations, so long as such activities do not create “two Chinas” or a “one China, one Taiwan” scenario.
As a result, Taiwan has gained observer status for two straight years in the World Health Assembly pending Beijing’s approval, which virtually amounts to an annual review system.
Under his “China first” policy, Ma has constantly played down Taiwan’s sovereignty, a term he used to repeat like a mantra during his election campaign. By remaining mum on China’s military expansion, human rights violations in Tibet, the suppression of press freedom and Beijing’s international propaganda campaign which claims that “Taiwan is a part of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Ma has reinforced the impression in international public opinion that the two sides of the Strait are marching down the road to unification.
He has not kept his “6-3-3” election pledge, putting the blame entirely on the worsening global economic environment and even once stated that his plan would only be implemented by 2016. The image of the Ma government suffered in the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot in August last year, as well as subsequently relaxing a ban on US beef imports despite public protests.
Ma’s “two lost years” illustrates a dilemma: How can a president with approval ratings of less than 30 percent and such low levels of trust afford to overlook the public’s will or just go through the motions of listening to the people while persistently promoting an ECFA that largely lacks popular support and is politically highly sensitive?
So, President Ma, before offering the Taiwanese people another illusion of “10 golden years,” please tell us why you messed up in your first “two lost years.”
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taiwan Brain Trust in Taipei.
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