The decision by US President Barack Obama’s administration to seek a new way forward in US-Myanmar relations recognizes that decades of trying to isolate Myanmar in order to change the behavior of its government have achieved little. With Myanmar’s ruling generals preparing to hold elections later this year — for the first time since 1990 — it is time to try something different.
Attempting to engage one of the world’s most authoritarian governments will not be easy. There is no evidence to indicate that Myanmar’s leaders will respond positively to the Obama administration’s central message, which calls for releasing the estimated 2,100 political prisoners (including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi), engaging in genuine dialogue with the opposition, and allowing fair and inclusive elections. In fact, the recently enacted electoral laws, which have been met with international condemnation, already point to a process that lacks credibility.
This past fall, we convened a task force under the auspices of the Asia Society to consider how the US can best pursue a path of engagement with Myanmar. We concluded that the US must ensure that its policies do not inadvertently support or encourage authoritarian and corrupt elements in Myanmar society. At the same time, if the US sets the bar too high at the outset, it will deny itself an effective role in helping to move Myanmar away from authoritarian rule and into the world community.
During this period of uncertainty, we recommend framing US policy toward Myanmar on the basis of changes taking place in the country, using both engagement and sanctions to encourage reform. The Obama administration’s decision to maintain trade and investment sanctions on Myanmar in the absence of meaningful change, particularly with regard to the Burmese government’s intolerance of political opposition, is correct.
Yet there are other measures that should be pursued now. The US should engage not only with Myanmar’s leaders, but also with a wide range of groups inside the country to encourage the dialogue necessary to bring about national reconciliation of the military, democracy groups and non-Burmese nationalities. The removal by the US of some non-economic sanctions designed to restrict official bilateral interaction is welcome, and an even greater relaxation in communications, through both official and unofficial channels, should be implemented. Expanding such channels, especially during a period of potential political change, will strengthen US leverage.
To reach the Burmese people directly, the US should continue to develop and scale up assistance programs, while preserving cross-border assistance. Assistance to non-governmental organizations should be expanded, and US assistance also should be targeted toward small farmers and small and medium-sized businesses. Educational exchanges under the Fulbright and Humphrey Scholar programs and cultural outreach activities should be increased. These programs produce powerful agents for community development in Myanmar and can significantly improve the prospects for better governance.
US policy should shift to a more robust phase if Myanmar’s leaders begin to relax political restrictions, institute economic reforms and advance human rights. If there is no movement on these fronts, there will likely be pressure in the US for tightening sanctions. If there is no recourse but to pursue stronger sanctions, the US should coordinate with others, including the EU and ASEAN, to impose targeted financial and banking measures to ensure that military leaders and their associates cannot evade the impact of what otherwise would be less-effective unilateral sanctions.
If a different scenario emerges, it should open the way for a much more active US role in assisting with capacity building, governance training and international efforts to encourage economic reforms. One priority should be the development of an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that revenues from the sale of natural gas are properly accounted for, repatriated and allocated to meet urgent national needs.
In adjusting its policy toward Myanmar, the US must face reality with a clear vision of what its foreign policy can achieve. US influence in Myanmar is unlikely to outweigh that of increasingly powerful Asian neighbors. Therefore, the US should make collaboration with other key stakeholders, particularly ASEAN, the UN and Myanmar’s neighbors — including China, India and Japan — the centerpiece of its policy.
In every respect, conditions in Myanmar are among the most dire of any country in the world and it will take decades, if not generations, to reverse current downward trends and create a foundation for a sustainable and viable democratic government and a prosperous society. The US needs to position itself to respond effectively and flexibly to the twists and turns that a potential transition in Myanmar may take over time, with an eye toward pressing the Burmese leadership to move in positive directions.
Wesley K. Clark is a Senior Fellow at UCLA’s Burkle Center for International Relations. Henrietta H. Fore is a former administrator of USAID. Both are co-chairs of the Asia Society-sponsored Task Force on US Policy Toward Myanmar. Suzanne DiMaggio is director of Policy Studies at the Asia Society.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with