The world’s most severe earthquakes of recent memory are notable for taking place in states that are politically stable — or at least those that have a working infrastructure. The Sichuan Earthquake in China, the Kashmir disaster of 2005, the Bam quake in Iran in late 2003 — all took place in regions that were remote and/or poverty-stricken, but there was at least some hope of response by central officials. International assistance, where it was welcomed, had to be moderated to some extent by sovereign considerations.
In Haiti, a state that has been struggling to get on its feet after decades of authoritarian rule, gang warfare and economic ruin, and which remains the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, coping with the outcome of frequent hurricanes has been challenge enough. The shallow 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince on Tuesday is remarkable, however, in that the already compromised capacity of central government services has been rendered utterly impotent.
The result of this disaster is an international relief and rescue effort that may come to rival the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of late 2004 in geopolitical terms.
The US has led the way, as it should, in pledging and delivering relief to Haitians. It has also been encouraging to note the quick response of other countries in the region, including Venezuela, which for once is not in the news for scuttling its own infrastructure in the service of presidential folly.
Haiti is a Taiwanese ally, one of only a few. It is paramount that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs develop a long-term relief strategy that coordinates with other major donor nations. It is important to do so not because of the possibility that a Chinese injection of aid and assistance might lead to the severing of ties between Haiti and Taiwan, but because after years of cash flowing to Haiti from Taipei, the improvements in local conditions and bilateral benefits have been marginal at best.
Honor and strategy both dictate that Taiwan help protect Haitians from the natural elements and from the terror of lawlessness. There is much more that Taipei can do to fulfill this responsibility.
The US will be the main protector of Haiti as it enters a new period of despair, fear and (probably) violence, but Taiwan must make its presence felt. The ruination of Haiti and the attendant social breakdown would mark a regional crisis that could ensnare several neighboring nations in a morass of unmanageable refugee migrations. Taiwan has the money, the manpower and a certain level of expertise to help the US stop this from happening.
Taiwan’s government can complain all it likes about a lack of recognition in the international community, but unless it is prepared to display leadership, generosity and intelligence in its dealings with blighted ally nations, then it will have traveled only the shortest distance from a time when its allies included some of the most malevolent governments in modern history.
The unspeakable disaster in Haiti provides this administration with a real chance to prove itself worthy of the name “nation” — and to follow up pretty language with a comprehensive, well-financed, long-term commitment to the future of all Haitians.
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