With cross-strait tensions easing and 12 agreements reached by the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing is using economic means to promote unification. Yet it has not ruled out the use of force against Taiwan nor scrapped its “Anti-Secession” Law.
As Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election approaches, China is likely to freeze or reduce the number of its missiles pointed at Taiwan. For the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and US President Barack Obama’s administration, how to respond to this would pose a problem.
While meeting then-US president George W. Bush at Bush’s Texas ranch in October 2002, then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) proposed a link between China’s missile deployment and US arms sales to Taiwan.
Last month, retired Chinese Lieutenant General Li Jijun (李際均) said at a seminar in Taipei that the withdrawal of missiles was negotiable, but added that a withdrawal would be the consequence of — not a prerequisite to — cross-strait peace talks.
Beijing has thus dismissed calls by Taipei and Washington to withdraw its missiles, and at the same time, wants to destroy the legitimacy of US arms sales to Taiwan. Hence, Taipei would have to make concrete concessions in cross-strait talks, and the international community would likely welcome Beijing’s move because a reduction of missiles is, after all, better than an increase.
With the KMT government touting this success, the strength of any DPP response would likely weaken. If the public feels Beijing is showing some goodwill, it will not think of the cross-strait missile crisis of 1995 and 1996. Taiwan’s fragile psychological defense will be confused by the misconception that peace has arrived.
Beijing can handle its missiles targeting Taiwan in several ways: avoid provocation, increase their number or remove them. Beijing could merely freeze its increasing deployment or it could withdraw a substantial number of missiles, but it is unlikely that it would withdraw them all. Even if it did so, it could quickly redeploy them at any time.
While it has refused to rule out military force, Beijing may also stress that as long as Taiwan does not declare independence, China will not attack.
Beijing says that if Taiwan embraces the concept of “one China,” there will be no war and Taiwan will not have to spend money on US arms.
The problem is that the KMT government does accept the “one China” principle — yet Beijing has not ruled out military force. And as Taiwan is a democracy, KMT rule cannot be guaranteed in the long-term.
The government’s talks with China have rarely touched on sensitive political issues, but as the pace of negotiations picks up, they will eventually run into the matter of sovereignty.
Even with cross-strait talks thus far placing business ahead of politics, security matters are already being touched upon through unofficial channels.
Retired military officers, academics and experts from both sides are exploring the possibility of setting up a mechanism for building military trust. They have proposed beginning with cooperation at certain spots in the South China Sea.
China can use the withdrawal of missiles as a kind of psychological warfare against Taiwan. Even if the Obama administration sells Black Hawk helicopters to Taiwan, it may continue to refuse the more crucial F-16C/D jet fighters. Taiwan’s security concerns are no less serious after the latest cross-strait talks.
Lin Cheng-yi is a research fellow of the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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