The ninth dialogue on Sino-US relations and regional security took place at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies in Shanghai on May 8 and May 9. The dialogue was co-sponsored by the Center for American Studies at Fudan, the CNA Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Pacific Forum CSIS.
At the event, Tao Wenzhao (陶文昭) a senior fellow at the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, spoke about several issues regarding cross-strait relations. While mentioning the significance of Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency, particularly the subsequent cooling of tensions across the Taiwan Strait following Ma’s election, Tao also said that China could budge no further with concessions to Taiwan.
This unwillingness to grant further concessions to Taiwan, Tao said, stemmed from the antagonism between the pan-green and pan-blue camps in Taiwan. It seemed that, according to Tao, improving cross-strait relations hinges upon Ma’s ability to remain in power and provide China with continuing concessions and posturing. But in the eyes of Chinese leaders, Ma’s efforts could easily come to nought should the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the rest of the pan-green coalition make a comeback.
The pan-green’s potential comeback appears at least somewhat likely, given the recent economic woes Taiwan has faced. Add to that the slow response to Typhoon Morakot, and recent electoral developments and you have yourself the workings of a comeback for the opposition — at least in theory.
Whether the DPP and its allies can capitalize on such developments is a question that remains unanswered.
But missed in this mixture of political rhetoric and slamming of the “independence forces” in Taiwan is the tacit consent of all involved — including US participants — that the pan-green coalition is inherently a threat to peace across the Taiwan Strait. However, although in theory the pan-green’s political ideologies, at least at face value, clash with Beijing’s political aims, there is no evidence to support the claim that the pan-green coalition is inherently a threat to peace.
If anything, it is Beijing’s misperception of the pan-green coalition that fuels this sentiment.
During former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) administration, cross-strait relations were tense, but they were not violent. In fact, nothing at all similar to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which occurred during the administration of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), came close to happening during Chen’s time in office. Taiwan neither claimed independence nor rattled any sabers at its behemoth neighbor, although Beijing itself certainly upped the rhetoric in denouncing Chen and his government.
Meanwhile, former US president George W. Bush criticized Chen for his remarks. This gave the perception that the US, in order to preserve stability in the Taiwan Strait, would rather have a member of the pan-blue alliance, a group more willing to appease Beijing, at the helm of Taiwan’s government.
But this served Beijing’s purposes more than Washington’s. The “status quo” remained, despite Chen’s rhetoric, and Beijing got what it wanted: Washington’s tacit consent that Chen and the pan-green coalition were reckless, hell-bent on independence and not to be trusted with power. Moreover, Washington’s reaction implied that Taiwan’s status as a multi-party, democratic and self-governing nation was not useful in Washington’s scheme of things.
This only furthers views of the US as a supporter of authoritarian and single-party systems of government that serve Washington’s goals, views that stretch back to pre-Cold War times. Although US-imposed democracy in Iraq appears to be an instrument of peace throughout the world, democracy in Taiwan, which includes the pan-green camp that both Washington and Beijing so obviously despise as rabble-rousers, is not worth protecting. And US President Barack Obama has shown almost no signs of supporting democracy in Taiwan even though he is viewed by so many in the world as a beacon of hope and freedom.
Whether you are blue or green, moderate or fanatical, you have to admit that the emergence and existence of the DPP and the pan-green coalition has given Taiwan its own bit of space — and respect — in the international eye. Years ago, as the Chinese Nationalist Party’s [KMT] single-party rule grew older and more repressive, people in the upper echelons of the US government began asking how on Earth the US government could continue to consider Taiwan “Free China”?
It is because of the emergence of the pan-green coalition, the existence of an “opposition” party and the election of an “opposition party” president that Taiwan has not only become a free and democratic society but also consolidated its democracy and earned the respect of other members in the global community, especially established democracies — and particularly the US. Even if Taiwan is a part of China and deserves to be called China, it can today truly be called “Free China” simply because it allows members of its own populace to regard Taiwan as something other than China.
What Tao’s statements — and those who agree with Tao — suggest is that Beijing equates a political comeback by the pan-green coalition as not only a show of belligerence by Taiwan and its people but also a reason for Beijing to act belligerently. In effect, what Tao is saying is that missiles aimed at Taiwan cannot be removed because opposition forces exist and have the ability to seize power. It is a cloaked threat — one that US academics and experts accept hook, line and sinker.
But Tao is merely creating a scapegoat. His statements admit the fear and weakness of the Beijing government. During the years that no opposition was allowed in Taiwan, Beijing acted belligerently. And crowning Ma King of Formosa will not raise Taiwan’s status in the global community — and certainly not in the eyes of Beijing. Let us remember that in any reunification scheme involving Taiwan and China, even the KMT would be considered an opposition party. And we all know that the Chinese Communist Party cannot accept opposition — from anywhere or anyone.
Nathan Novak is a Taiwan-based researcher in Chinese and Taiwanese history and cross-strait relations.
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