For many years, the cross-strait situation has allowed fugitives to remain in China. But following protracted negotiations, Taiwan and China have finally signed an agreement to cooperate on crime-fighting and judicial matters. Much of the public will welcome the development in the belief that suspects wanted for serious crimes — economic and otherwise — will be repatriated to face trial if authorities ask for the help of their Chinese counterparts.
This would improve crime fighting efforts, but certain undemocratic aspects of the deal deserve scrutiny.
Article 4, clause 3 stipulates that in cases where one side considers a person a criminal suspect and the other does not, but that involve considerable “harm” to society, the two sides should deal with the matter on a case-by-case basis based on mutual consent. It may be that this regulation was included to cover all eventualities and that it leaves room for interpretation. Although well-meant, such a broad clause could have serious consequences.
Taiwan is a refuge for many Chinese democracy campaigners who reject authoritarian rule.
In China, these people cried out for democracy and rule of law, challenging the Chinese Communist Party and thereby committing “crimes” in the eyes of Beijing.
There are also many Taiwanese who advocate independence. From China’s perspective, they are “splittists” and are considered criminals.
Taiwan is also home to Falun Gong practitioners whose calls for religious freedom are anathema to Beijing. China considers their criticism a source of social unrest and they could therefore fall within the definition of activities that harm society.
Our government may think these worries unfounded, but the weaker signatory to an agreement is more vulnerable to political pressure. Making the content of agreements as precise as possible could help avoid controversy later on. Otherwise, when a dispute arises, the stronger party will try to dodge its responsibilities, while the weaker party will be pressured into honoring the terms of the clause.
Taiwan is becoming increasingly dependent on China economically. In a position of weakness, it may one day find it hard to refuse objectionable extradition requests from Beijing.
If China demands people be repatriated, will our government be able to refuse?
For Taiwanese, activities that Beijing sees as a threat — such as exercising freedom of speech and religion — are part and parcel of democracy. Would our government turn its back on these fundamental values?
Another cause for concern is Article 24, which states that the agreement will take effect once each side has completed the necessary preparations, no more than 60 days after the deal was signed.
It is true that not all international agreements need to be scrutinized by legislative bodies, and there are international examples of agreements taking effect without legislative review.
However, this applies without exception to non-controversial technical agreements where there is no major conflict of interest.
The crime-fighting agreement does not fit this description in either form or substance.
According to constitutional interpretation No. 329 of the Council of Grand Justices, if an agreement signed by government authorities “involves important issues of the nation or rights and duties of the people and its legality is sustained ... [it] should be sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation.”
This agreement has a bearing on the rights and duties of all citizens. It will have a strong impact on the nation’s democracy and basic values. How could the government agree to implement this deal within 60 days?
The agreement was formulated and signed without any public participation and the legislature was deprived of its right to scrutinize it. It is an assault on democratic values and the way it has been processed is unconstitutional.
Executive and legislative agencies as well as the public should not let this slip through without further debate.
Chiang Huang-chih is an associate professor in the College of Law at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
China badly misread Japan. It sought to intimidate Tokyo into silence on Taiwan. Instead, it has achieved the opposite by hardening Japanese resolve. By trying to bludgeon a major power like Japan into accepting its “red lines” — above all on Taiwan — China laid bare the raw coercive logic of compellence now driving its foreign policy toward Asian states. From the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas to the Himalayan frontier, Beijing has increasingly relied on economic warfare, diplomatic intimidation and military pressure to bend neighbors to its will. Confident in its growing power, China appeared to believe
After more than three weeks since the Honduran elections took place, its National Electoral Council finally certified the new president of Honduras. During the campaign, the two leading contenders, Nasry Asfura and Salvador Nasralla, who according to the council were separated by 27,026 votes in the final tally, promised to restore diplomatic ties with Taiwan if elected. Nasralla refused to accept the result and said that he would challenge all the irregularities in court. However, with formal recognition from the US and rapid acknowledgment from key regional governments, including Argentina and Panama, a reversal of the results appears institutionally and politically
In 2009, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) made a welcome move to offer in-house contracts to all outsourced employees. It was a step forward for labor relations and the enterprise facing long-standing issues around outsourcing. TSMC founder Morris Chang (張忠謀) once said: “Anything that goes against basic values and principles must be reformed regardless of the cost — on this, there can be no compromise.” The quote is a testament to a core belief of the company’s culture: Injustices must be faced head-on and set right. If TSMC can be clear on its convictions, then should the Ministry of Education
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) provided several reasons for military drills it conducted in five zones around Taiwan on Monday and yesterday. The first was as a warning to “Taiwanese independence forces” to cease and desist. This is a consistent line from the Chinese authorities. The second was that the drills were aimed at “deterrence” of outside military intervention. Monday’s announcement of the drills was the first time that Beijing has publicly used the second reason for conducting such drills. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is clearly rattled by “external forces” apparently consolidating around an intention to intervene. The targets of
RSS