Since the change in Taiwan’s government in May, there have been statements in the media about what the government plans to do, especially on cross-strait relations. There has been a reopening of meetings between the two sides, which is important. There has been an opening of charter airline flights and visits by Chinese to Taiwan, neither of which has gained much economically.
Taiwan has continued to lay out a long list of issues it hopes to address with China, however, understanding that Beijing will be completely preoccupied with the Olympics until after Aug. 24. In the meantime, Taiwan has to deal with a sluggish economy and a poor stock market performance. It has already allowed many companies to invest up to 60 percent of their net worth in China. There are still concerns even in the media that the government will soon lift a ban on some investments by Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in China.
In addition, foreign firms with Chinese equity investment will be allowed to be listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, lifting a long-standing rule that bars companies with 20 percent or more Chinese equity from investing in Taiwan. The government will also lift a rule that bars companies from using funds they borrow or raise in Taiwan to invest in China.
A plan to allow Taiwanese liquid-crystal makers to set up panel factories in China is also under consideration. At the same time, the Straits Exchange Foundation openly discussed closer economic cooperation in the meeting with the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in June. There were even discussions on different economic agreements, including the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement that exists between Hong Kong and Beijing.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) complains that such serious matters should not be launched so hastily on matters that could have impact on the country and the people.
Taiwanese companies worry about Chinese investors’ methods of using the capital generated in Taiwan back in China; that rules and regulations do not have real comprehensive policies that cover Chinese investments in Taiwan (considering that many if not most of the Chinese investors have connections to the Chinese government).
While making changes in Taiwan that will please China, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) often states the wish that the two sides can find a way of interacting in international society.
Ma has frequently warned that if Taiwan continues to be isolated on the international scene, there could be no significant progress in cross-strait relations, but he continues to propose “viable diplomacy” and a “diplomatic truce” in cross-strait relations.
At any rate, the Olympic Games have begun, and political issues regarding China, including cross-strait relations, will have to wait until after Aug. 24 — at least. Even then there could be problems within the Chinese government.
There have been many articles about what China will be like after the Olympics. Two recent ones in the Wall Street Journal show the differences.
In James Mann’s “Reform Fantasy,” he said: “China has reached the point where it no longer seeks to mollify or accommodate the international community’s expressions of concern about human rights.”
The question, Mann said, was not whether China will be nationalistic, but what sort of nationalism it will have. The Olympics should prompt the rest of the world to start thinking about the implications of a China that is not opening up in the way that was hoped.
In Bruce Gilley’s “China’s Democratic Acceleration,” he said: “No one expects the Games to lead to regime collapse in China, especially not immediately. But change? Yes ... By denying the Communist Party its moment of glory, the dissonance created by the Olympic year will accelerate the values transformation in China needed to erode the regime’s popular support.”
What these two sides suggest is about China and the differences in how the rest of the world sees it. But Taiwan could have a different concern — how China will see Taiwan.
It will be seen, however, after the Games are completed and talks between the two sides start again.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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