Taiwanese voters have overwhelmingly elected Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) with a 17 percent margin. The KMT now has control of the legislature, the presidency and most local governments. In short, the KMT now enjoys the strongest political position it has held since the beginning of open, democratic politics in Taiwan. But now the difficult task of governing starts, and no issue will be more difficult than to manage cross-strait relations. My advice to Ma in this endeavor is to follow the lead of Theodore Roosevelt, the US president from 1900 to 1909: "Speak softly and carry a big stick."
China greeted Ma's election with a mixture of "cautious optimism" and relief that they no longer have to deal with President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). For at least four years, Beijing will not be exasperated by a leadership in Taipei proposing de jure separation.
The fundamental problem with Chen's approach to cross-strait relations was that he insisted on poking his finger in China's eye without having the political capital necessary to strengthen Taiwan's defenses should Beijing lash out as a result. In February 2006 he closed the National Unification Council, further aggravating his already testy relations with Beijing.
Since his election in 2000, Chen's actions have only added fuel to China's military modernization, giving the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a ready rationale to demand more funding. It has also contributed to the deployment of more than 1,000 ballistic missiles in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan. In this way Chen's actions have only contributed to the deterioration of Taiwan's security situation, not to mention potentially dragging the US into a dangerous conflict.
However, the KMT is not entirely blameless, either. Each time Chen sought to purchase a package of defensive weapons from the US, the KMT and its allies in the legislature were able to defeat the measure -- more than 62 times. It is unclear if the KMT was merely trying to restrain Chen or if they actually did not want to make the purchase. Ma declined to reveal his position.
Here is where Roosevelt comes in. When Ma does come to power, he should take a page from Roosevelt's playbook. He does not advocate an independent Taiwan, so speaking softly should be fairly easy: Ma is unlikely to provoke China with statements or symbolic actions. He should revive the unification council, push the discussions for direct transportation links and reduce restrictions on Taiwanese investment in China. For Beijing, this will represent an immediate and tangible improvement over Chen.
But Ma must also not forget the second half of Roosevelt's dictum. He must continue to prepare Taiwan's military for potential conflict. This means that he should continue military exercises and computer simulations of a Chinese attack to maintain readiness, and that he should ensure the KMT legislators approve the purchase of weapons from the US. Beijing will undoubtedly raise a stink, but its Taiwan policy has become far more rational and measured than in the past.
If the purchase is timed to coincide with signals that Ma does not plan to move toward independence, it will go a long way toward conciliating China. Ma has the advantage that almost anything he does will look good compared to Chen.
In short, speaking softly and carrying a big stick will allow Ma to give China the "face" it needs for its own domestic purposes even as Taiwan maintains its ability to deter an attack. Taking common sense steps to improve its military capabilities while keeping quiet about independence is advantageous for the US, for China and for Taiwan itself. Hopefully, Ma's election will move us in that direction.
Alex Liebman is a doctoral candidate in Harvard University's government department.
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
It is being said every second day: The ongoing recall campaign in Taiwan — where citizens are trying to collect enough signatures to trigger re-elections for a number of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators — is orchestrated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), or even President William Lai (賴清德) himself. The KMT makes the claim, and foreign media and analysts repeat it. However, they never show any proof — because there is not any. It is alarming how easily academics, journalists and experts toss around claims that amount to accusing a democratic government of conspiracy — without a shred of evidence. These
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
RSS