Print

Mail

wiki links

Trust is key to making progress in North Korea

The rescheduling of the North-South Korea summit to October allows time to consider how inter-Korean talks, Six-Party Talks and possible four-party peace talks can work in concert for stability and development on the Korean Peninsula. At this juncture, it is most important for South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the US to realize that the five parties should not sacrifice trust among them for short-term gains with North Korea.

Last month, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors confirmed the shutdown of North Korea's nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Forward momentum in dealing with North Korea is welcome news, but the road ahead is marked with big promises that are difficult to achieve: denuclearization, economic development, a peace treaty and normalized diplomatic relations.

Pyongyang must be convinced that ending its nuclear programs and opening up to the international economy are strategic decisions in its own interests, not ploys to attack or cause the collapse of North Korea.

The Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement of the Six-Party Talks recognizes the need to build this trust, calling for disarmament actions matched in stages with economic and diplomatic rewards. The tragedy is that positive steps with North Korea have historically proved short-lived, while major engagement initiatives damaged trust among the five parties.

This was the case with the 1994 Framework Agreement negotiated between the US and North Korea. While the agreement postponed a nuclear crisis, Seoul came to believe it could not trust Washington to represent South Korean interests.

In 2002, the Japanese prime minister traveled to North Korea to make a breakthrough on diplomatic normalization. The effort backfired because of the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago. South Korea and China have since considered Japan's diplomacy counterproductive.

Most recently, South Korea has led efforts to build trust with North Korea through joint economic projects. While these initiatives have yet to soften North Korea's policies, US-South Korea and South Korea-Japan relations were strained by what Washington and Tokyo saw as Seoul's unconditional engagement of a nuclear and missile proliferator.

If concerned parties have learned from experience, they will not sacrifice trust among them for short-term advances with North Korea.

The US should not pursue military talks with North Korea outside the six-party framework as such talks would make South Korea and China anxious about being excluded from negotiations.

China should not look to patch up its relations with North Korea by giving aid and assurances to offset its hard line after Pyongyang's nuclear test in October. Doing so would damage Beijing's credibility for facilitating the Six-Party Talks.

Japan should not press the abduction issue at the expense of progress on denuclearization. Certainly, Pyongyang must account for missing Japanese citizens in order to gain the benefits of normalized relations with Tokyo. But five-party trust will be damaged if Japanese politicians are perceived to be using the abduction issue for domestic political consumption.

Finally, South Korea should be wary about spending too much on symbolic steps with North Korea. South Korean assistance to the North (other than emergency humanitarian aid) should be conditioned on concrete reciprocal actions by Pyongyang.

Otherwise, Seoul's efforts would appear to be more concerned with the upcoming South Korean presidential election than with improving security on the Korean Peninsula.

Leif-Eric Easley is a doctoral candidate at Harvard University.
This story has been viewed 1472 times.