Will history tell us we were fools? We worried about the wrong war and made the wrong enemies. In the first decade of the 21st century the leaders of the US and the UK allowed themselves to be distracted by a few Islamist bombers and took easy refuge in the politics of fear. They concocted a "war on terror" and went off to fight little nations that offered quick wins.
Meanwhile these leaders neglected the great strategic challenge of the aftermath of the Cold War: the fate of Russia and its mighty arsenals, its soul tormented by military and political collapse, its pride undimmed. They danced on Moscow's grave and hurled abuse at its shortcomings.
They drove its leaders to assert a new energy-based hegemony and find new allies. The result was a new arms race and -- after a Kremlin coup -- a new war. Is that the path we are treading?
When John Maynard Keynes returned from Versailles in 1919 he wrote an attack on the treaty that ended World War I.
In The Economic Consequences of the Peace he warned that punishing Germany and demanding crippling reparations would jeopardize Europe's stability and the building of German democracy. He confronted politicians, on both sides of the Atlantic, puffed up with the vanity of victory and convinced that the German menace had been laid to rest. He was right and they were wrong.
For the past six years Washington's whirling dervishes have reduced Anglo-American foreign policy to a frenzy of bullying hatred of anyone they dislike. One half of this neo-conservative agenda is heading for the rocks, US dominance in the Middle East following a stunning victory over a Muslim state. But the other half is alive and well, pushing ahead with the missile defense system bequeathed by the Reagan administration.
This so-called Star Wars system is militarily unproven and, with the end of the Cold War, of no apparent urgency. But it is astronomically expensive and, as such, has powerful support within the US industry-led defense community.
When US Vice President Dick Cheney was finding President George W. Bush a defense secretary in 2000, Donald Rumsfeld's chief qualification was his enthusiasm for space-based defense. Hence the US' 2002 renunciation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Hence the installation of defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, in defiance of what had been promised to Russia at the end of the Cold War. Hence Rumsfeld's frequent jibes against old Europe in favor of "new."
Russian President Vladimir Putin's reactive threat this week to retarget his missiles at west Europe was reckless and stupid.
Just when nuclear disarmament is again a live issue and his old enemy, NATO, faces defeat in Afghanistan, he tossed red meat to the defense hawks in Washington (and London). He strengthened the case for a new British Trident and encouraged an arms race that he knows his own country can ill afford, just as it can ill afford to send Europe frantically seeking alternative energy supplies.
Yet nations do not always act rationally, especially those with authoritarian rulers. Putin's belligerence was the predictable outcome of a Western diplomacy towards Russia whose ineptitude would amaze even Keynes. NATO's dismissal of Moscow's approach for membership, like the EU's similar cold shoulder, wholly misunderstood Russian psychology.
The loss of its east European satellites was not just a loss of empire but revived age-old border insecurity. The pretence that Rumsfeld's installations, which could be placed anywhere, were aimed at "rogue states such as North Korea" was so ludicrous that only British Prime Minister Tony Blair believed it.
There was a moment after 1990 when Russia was weak, immature and unstable, and longed for the embrace of friendship. Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton, even Blair in his pre-poodle phase, understood this. Neither side had an interest in reviving the Cold War.
Under Bush this has been replaced by an assumption that he should dictate the terms of Russia's conversion to capitalism and democracy, even as Western leaders cringingly paid court to the dictators of Beijing. This undermined Moscow's internationalists and played into the hands of Putin's hardliners. It was repeated in Bush's speech in Prague on Tuesday.
Putin is throwing down a gauntlet not to the West so much as to his own Kremlin successors. He is warning them never to trust the West. To him it remains incorrigibly imperialist, hypocritical in its global morality and unreliable in its treaties. So he is telling them to cause mischief with oil and gas. Deny help over Iran and Kosovo. Stay armed and on-guard.
A new study by Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, examines the options facing world leaders in 1940 and 1941: Should Adolf Hitler attack Russia; should Japan expand west or south; should the US enter the war? The answers now seem embedded in the concrete of history but at the time they might have gone otherwise. Like the 1914 shooting of the archduke in Sarajevo, the events that trigger conflict are easy to see with hindsight. At the time they might have turned on a penny.
The task of statecraft is to detect the pennies. Were NATO and Europe wise to snub Russia and thus, de facto, dig a new political ravine across Europe? Was the US wise to provoke Russia's generals by moving its military presence close to their borders? While defending the West's commercial interests required a firm line, was it wise to deliver a stream of criticism on Moscow's internal regime? Now the West wants to stir Russia's historic ally, Serbia, into nationalist fury by "granting" independence to Kosovo.
Why should Russia tell Belgrade to acquiesce and demand from Europe some economic quid pro quo? Why not sit back and laugh as the US and the UK find themselves policing yet another Balkan civil war?
We may be witnessing only the paranoid exchanges of three world leaders on their way out. For all its ailments, the world is incomparably more stable than it was in 1940. But a strategic risk is being taken with Moscow, and therefore by Moscow in return. Who knows: The Iraq war may seem a foolish incompetence alongside the West's misjudgment of Russia over the past decade.
Following Cold War with cold peace may yet prove an historic error. And it was gratuitously unnecessary.
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
It is being said every second day: The ongoing recall campaign in Taiwan — where citizens are trying to collect enough signatures to trigger re-elections for a number of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators — is orchestrated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), or even President William Lai (賴清德) himself. The KMT makes the claim, and foreign media and analysts repeat it. However, they never show any proof — because there is not any. It is alarming how easily academics, journalists and experts toss around claims that amount to accusing a democratic government of conspiracy — without a shred of evidence. These
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
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