Several days ago the US said in a statement that it does not support steps that would appear to change Taiwan's status unilaterally, such as changing names of entities that are based within Taiwan. The statement was public and must have pleased China, while it embarrassed the legitimate leaders of Taiwan on a subject most Taiwanese support and which has been dealt with before with no problem.
For years Taiwan had a provincial government that had considerable power, especially covering government financing (which included most government owned companies). This was essentially done away with in the mid-1990s. Like the present issue, it was based on democratic necessity. US experts at that time fretted that China would find that action unacceptable. This proved not to be the case.
In this present case, the effort by Taiwan to change names is not only an effort by political leaders for political purposes. It is also a legitimate need for broader purposes.
The history of the US-Taiwan Business Council, located in Washington, seems to have been forgotten. It was originally called the US?ROC Economic Council, with its counterpart ROC?US Economic Council in Taipei. Eventually the council's name was changed to its present name because many US businesses couldn't find it -- they thought the ROC (Republic of China) was China.
Since the very beginning of democratization in Taiwan, the US has put off for many years the need to make useful changes in conducting this special relationship. After much agony, it was tried in 1994. Not much came out of it. There was a greater explanation of what would not be done -- to satisfy China -- than what changes would need to be made to what has become a relationship between two democracies.
Now, with the rise of China and India, the changes occurring in Russia and the US' focus on the Middle East, the impact on the continuing cross-strait issue is becoming even more difficult to manage. Following the studies and institutions that helped shape worldwide economic rules, more worldwide studies on developing political changes are beginning to emerge. Inevitably this will have a considerable impact on cross-strait issues.
These are long-term efforts, but in the meantime policies are made on short-term issues. China, for example, has been trying to convince other countries, especially the US, that this is the year Taiwan could very likely move toward independence via changes to its Constitution. They know well that the Taiwanese laws being considered are domestic in nature and that in any event, it is almost impossible to make changes to the Constitution in such a short time.
Some friends of China seem to believe that pressing others to prevent Taiwan's possible action is a sign that Beijing is improving its international behavior. China's concerns are more likely meant to reduce any attention on not only the Taiwan issue, but to domestic concerns during next year's Olympics. They had little to say regarding domestic name changes until after the US had publicly made its statement on the issue.
The US focus on cross-strait issues is primarily on lowering tensions. As important as that is, and aside from the relationship with China, the US ought to concern itself with not only the domestic politics of Taiwan, but in gaining consensus within the many elements of the government in Washington.
Taiwan's two major political parties have very different objectives that impact on the direction the nation is likely to take. The question for the US is: What should it do once the elections are over?
The Democratic Progressive Party will continue strengthening "Taiwanese identity" at home, continue efforts to increase the ntaion's international status through democratization and economic relationships and to move as much as possible toward independence.
The Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) objective for now is to regain power at any cost. If it is successful, it has made clear that it seeks eventual unification with China. Its present priorities, such as greater economic and cultural relations with China, are part of that objective.
Instead of chasing after name changes of little consequence, the US had better try to determine what future relationship with Taiwan would best serve its interest.
At this stage, one party states it would establish a much broader relationship with China. Little is said about security issues, but its actions have shown that Taiwan would likely not be much involved in that issue.
The other party would continue to press for its political objectives. As a consequence it may well be troublesome, but its interest will likely be in continuing close relations with its present friends, while continuing to seek dialogue with Beijing.
Instead of pressing Taiwan not to change names, it would have been better if Washington had pressed China into establishing a dialogue with the elected leaders of Taiwan. Unfortunately, the US also did not seem to have the kind of dialogue with Taiwan that is needed.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
RSS