The notion that because Taiwan is already independent, it doesn't have to seek independence has been in existence for a long time. However, to determine whether a nation is truly sovereign and independent, it must possess four essential elements that define a state: its own territory, citizenry, government and sovereignty.
Unfortunately, Taiwan does not completely meet these qualifications.
In terms of its territory, as long as the the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) remains unchanged, the territory of the ROC will not be the same as that of Taiwan.
As for its own citizenry, when we look at regulations referring to the "people of the `mainland' area," it should be obvious that the continuing existence of these regulations is sheer absurdity.
In terms of a government, the Constitution states that Taiwan is but "an area" or "a province." This explains why the Taiwan provincial government was reduced to playing a symbolic role instead of being abolished altogether.
Sovereignty has two main meanings: total control over a territory and dealing with other countries on an equal footing.
Unfortunately, according to these criteria, Taiwan cannot be said to be a sovereign state.
Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) allowed China's legislature to pass an "Anti-Secession" Law to deny Taiwan sovereign status. And Beijing's efforts to propagate its "one China" policy all over the world are also intended to suppress and destroy Taiwan's sovereign position in the international community.
Therefore, where the quest for Taiwanese independence once meant to move away from the dispute over whether or not the ROC represents China, now the quest is to shake off the shackles of Beijing's "one China" policy and its brazen claim that the People's Republic of China (PRC) can represent Taiwan.
Those who believe that Taiwan should only seek "normalization" rather than independence have obviously ignored Beijing's efforts to spread its "one China" policy, turn its dispute with Taiwan into an internal matter and nurture pro-China or pro-unification forces within Taiwan.
China's "united front" strategy divides Taiwanese into various political forces -- those seeking independence, those not seeking independence, those opposed to independence and those pursuing unification.
Undoubtedly, Beijing sees its arch-enemies as the pan-green, pro-independence diehards. As for those who believe that Taiwan need not seek independence, Beijing regards them as a clique of secondary enemies that accept Taiwan's de facto independence, but do not seek de jure independence.
Even when some merely seek to "correct the national title," "write a new constitution" or "normalize the country," Beijing still views their efforts as pursuing Taiwanese independence.
But when previous advocates of independence are willing to do a complete about-face -- as seen in the recent remarks of former president Lee Teng-hui (
This must come as a pleasant surprise to China, because the divide between the pan-green and pan-blue camps that was created when former Chinese Nationalist Party chairman Lien Chan (
Therefore, when contemplating the controversy over Lee's recent remarks, we must not let our enemy trap us into unwittingly helping him.
Lo Chih-cheng is the director of the department of political science at Soochow University.
Translated by Daniel Cheng
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