There have been polls recently that show an increasing number of people in Taiwan that consider themselves Taiwanese only. There is also a growing number of people who choose the "status quo" when asked if they would prefer independence or unification with China. Many researchers have found that younger voters increasingly consider themselves not only Taiwanese but prefer independence, and take for granted the fact that their country is a democracy.
With this background, Taiwan will have two very important national elections around a year from now. The differences between the two main political parties in these elections, however they are explained, are ideologically distant and likely to be very difficult to reconcile in the campaigns.
What this might mean to the US at a time of profound change in China -- and its impact on the US-China relationship -- is worth considering.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been unable to prevent the opposition-controlled legislature from blocking fundamental legislation needed to run the government and to protect the nation from harm from China. Finding the means to overcome this problem is just as important as finding the means to gain a form of international recognition.
Throughout the process of democratization, there were many important ideological differences within the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Yet many differences were overcome -- direct presidential elections was one prominent example. That achievement may have been easier to bring about than concurrence between the DPP and the KMT, but even under these conditions the broadening of referendum powers, for example, was agreed to (though not easily) between the pan-green and pan-blue camps.
The KMT now has a different set of problems. Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) started his term last year by laying out the party's objectives, which included unification and an acceptance of a "one China" policy, in addition to a less controversial angle of strengthening Taiwan's economic relationship with China.
This has since been weakened -- mainly by "pro-localization" members -- to "no independence and no unification" and the maintenance of a "status quo" on these subjects. However, several points of contention remain, including working for a 30 to 50 year peace deal with Beijing.
A recent article in the International Herald Tribune suggests that most of the objectives the KMT has outlined are attractive to many among the general public, including younger voters -- and even some DPP members.
I suspect that younger voters pay little attention to much of what is taking place. Some studies have shown that this kind of thinking is compatible with maintaining a unique national identity.
What would be the result of an agreement based on a long-term "status quo" in name, if not in fact? Trying to define the "status quo" in a cross-strait environment -- as with the "one China" policy versus the "one China" principle, or "support" versus "oppose," or "one country on both sides" of the Strait versus "one country, two systems" -- requires a continuously changing language all its own. Former president Lee Teng-hui (
China largely supports the idea of retaining the "status quo" because it suits its present policy, which is gradually becoming clearer. Beijing unilaterally makes changes that can be disadvantageous for Taiwan, but they do not threaten Washington's short-term policies. We may be witnessing one example of this now with Beijing getting itself involved much more deeply in Taiwan's domestic politics. Another example is the more vigorous effort to contain Taiwan's activities in the international community -- a matter of vital importance to Taipei.
As for Taiwan, it has on occasion defined the "status quo" as denoting a Taiwan that is sovereign, independent and requiring popular assent for any change to its status.
The first of these is less frequently spoken of to avoid provoking China as well as avoid creating tensions with Washington. Taiwan simply repeats its acceptance of the "status quo" with no unilateral changes, but it has established a very strong additional statement -- that any change in Taiwan's status must have popular support.
So the present kingpin pillar of US policy on cross-strait issues is maintaining the "status quo." China has good reason to support this position because it can continue to expand missile deployment activities opposite Taiwan, block Taiwan's participation in international organizations and retain its conception of what damages the "status quo."
Using the "status quo" as a long-term defense against efforts to coerce Taiwan into unification will not save it from this fate. One has to wonder how many of the voters that choose "status quo" in polls are aware of this.
How does this impact on the US-Taiwan relationship? Although there has been a change in China that requires Washington to broaden its relations with Beijing on many fronts, there is no clear change within Taiwan, or at least no apparent change.
The bilateral relationship today has urgent needs. From Taiwan's point of view, the two issues of supreme importance are expanding military resources and know-how and finding benefit from its conception of the "status quo."
As for the US, it needs a system of dialogue with Taiwan at a much more senior level, and this is just as urgent a need as those of Taiwan.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations