A recent survey conducted by CommonWealth (
Take our English-language education, for example. In the face of globalization, Taiwanese college students' English proficiency is well below par. English is not a required course at most schools except in the freshman year. During the 15th International Symposium on English Teaching last month, teachers said that although government leaders vowed in 2002 to make English a "semi-official" language within six years, no plans or measures had been proposed over the past four and a half years.
Such language policy is imprudent and irresponsible. Education is the foundation of a nation and has to be taken seriously. How will Taiwan improve its students' English to the level where they can compete with Singapore, Hong Kong and other countries?
To advance our language education, Jack Richards, a leading professor in teaching English as a second language, proposed some valuable suggestions during a recent visit to Taiwan. The MOE should take these into consideration as it amends its policies:
First, expand learning hours. Second, scale down objectives. Third, provide teacher training. Fourth, teach English in elementary schools. Fifth, promote bilingual education. Sixth, try innovative solutions. Seventh, redesign the curriculum. Eighth, rely on the private sector.
Moreover, according to my teaching experience, the best way is for learners to link learning to their interests and practice the language regularly and consistently. For the former, if a learner is a music fan, he or she can listen to more English songs and sing along with their idols to increase input. For the latter, listening to an English radio show for 15 minutes or English story CDs every night may be a good idea. Keeping a diary or a weekly journal in English is also an effective method.
Studies show that activities like keeping a diary can successfully promote "learner autonomy," eventually moving them from "teacher-centered" to "student-centered" learning. It not only stimulates practice but also reduces anxiety, encouraging them to keep trying or even think in the target language.
Since it is difficult for teachers to thoroughly correct all their students' work, such authentic activities -- along with specific checklists and evaluation forms -- serve as an alternative way for practice. Learners can even exchange their journals with one another to make these tasks more fun.
It would, of course, be better if we could reduce the large class sizes in Taiwan. For example, at certain prestigious Japanese universities, there are only four students in each English pronunciation class. But in Taiwan, I have heard that in some schools there are 70 to 80 students in every pronunciation class. How can teachers possibly correct students' pronunciation under such circumstances? No wonder the quality of our language education has gradually lagged behind that of other countries.
The situation clearly proves that unrealistic goals and empty slogans will take us nowhere. If we really want to catch up with the rest of the world and improve our competitiveness, we need to strengthen our language education in a more effective and efficient way. Hopefully, the government can pay attention to this, and take language teachers' suggestions into account.
Chang Sheng-en is a lecturer in the Department of Applied Foreign Languages at Shih Chien University.
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