As expected, due the confrontation between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, the opposition's recall motion against President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) failed to gain the support of two-thirds of all lawmakers in a vote last Tuesday morning. The whole script was already predicted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in a high-level party meeting on the evening of the Dragon Boat Festival on May 31. The only surprise was the fight over the leadership of the campaign between Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜).
The PFP advocated a recall from the beginning, while Ma advocated "thinking before acting" and later proposed a no-confidence vote against the Cabinet. However, due to pressure from his supporters and the media, he eventually changed his mind and supported the recall motion -- and even made the extraordinary legislative session the platform for an attempt to recall Chen.
This scenario implies that the pan-green camp decided long ago to confront the pan-blue camp, since it was the only way to resolve the pressure to remove Chen. Taking a closer look, it decided to deal promptly with Ma, the pan-blue camp's leader. After Ma said that Chen would "die a nasty death," Chen's supporters in southern Taiwan even threatened to "assassinate Ma."
Thus, Ma's image has gradually changed. Instead of the image of a political "Teflon man," Ma's participation in the recent political struggles and confrontation have given him a more ugly image. His support rating has also dropped from about 70 percent after his European and US trips to about 50 percent. He has never experienced a rollercoaster ride like this before.
Of course, Ma's troubles have not ended. Since escaping the recall, Chen has kept a low profile and proposed cross-party negotiations, while other DPP heavyweights have talked about discussing livelihood and economic issues with Ma.
Soong, meanwhile, has advocated holding another extraordinary legislative session in order to initiate a no-confidence vote against the Cabinet and launch another recall motion against Chen after new lawmakers are elected -- if, as expected, Chen were to dissolve the legislature after a no-confidence vote and call snap elections.
So Ma is caught in the crossfire from both inside and outside the party. If he refuses to participate in talks between the government and opposition, his expected 2008 presidential election campaign will inherit an image of political obstruction from former KMT chairman Lien Chan (
But if Ma attempts to take a more moderate stance or even cooperate with DPP heavyweights, then massive pressure from the "deep blues" is to be expected -- not to mention that Soong certainly won't give up the chance to challenge him.
The best path for Ma is to perpetuate blue-green confrontation and delay the arms procurement plan and the legislature's approval of Control Yuan members until 2008. He might also help delay the endorsement of the state public prosecutor-general, the flood prevention bill and other non-political issues.
Ma cannot work for reconciliation with DPP heavyweights in the wake of the intense recall battle.
This situation is a test of both his political character and leadership style. The recall motion is history, but it intensified the hatred between the two camps. As the pan-blue camp's leader, Ma is destined to inherit all political problems, and he will invite a backlash if he returns to the middle.
Still, the DPP is in big trouble too. After escaping the recall, Chen will definitely strike back when he gets the chance. His recent proposal for cross-party and cross-strait talks gave us some clues. But achieving a true reconciliation among parties will be more difficult than holding talks.
Internally, Ma will be safer if blue-green confrontation continues, since his status as the pan-blue camp's leader will collapse if he meets Chen again. Under such circumstances, the government will likely continue to suffer from obstruction and a political deadlock, as confrontation will remain the focus domestically over the next two years.
But strangely enough, there may be some room for cross-strait talks. In the past, Chen always believed that there would be some room for talks after his re-election in 2004. But he overlooked the fact that Beijing was unwilling to negotiate with him when he held the upper hand. Originally, the DPP's defeat in the 2004 legislative elections offered a good opportunity for talks, but that was dashed by Lien's and Soong's visits to China last year.
Recently, the two governments announced the opening of four types of special cross-strait charter flights -- cargo charter flights, holiday charter flights, charter flights for emergency medical treatment and humanitarian charter flights.
That breakthrough sent an important message. Obviously, Beijing is more generous in expressing its goodwill when Chen is under pressure. So the weaker he is, the more confident Beijing is when interacting with him. This offers a rare window of opportunity in the last two years of his presidency. In this situation, former president Lee Teng-hui's (
The recall motion was a turning point for many Taiwanese politicians. For example, Soong has discovered a new political stage, Chen has transformed judicial pressure into political victory, Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) has gained powers and DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun managed to stop the recall motion.
In contrast, Ma had to don a bulletproof vest in the face of alleged assassination threat, while the KMT had to prevent its headquarters from being surrounded by protesters opposing the recall motion. Clearly, the road to the presidency will be a long and winding one.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant research fellow of the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Eddy Chang
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of