The pan-blue camp's motion to recall President Chen Shui-bian (
The most disturbing aspect of the corruption scandals surrounding Chen is that they are being maintained through asymmetric information warfare. The continuing and sensational exposition by opposition lawmakers of alleged irregularities committed by the president's family and aides has obscured the truth. While these individuals have taken unscrupulous advantage of the freedom of speech to publicize their version of the truth, the judiciary is restricted by due process and the principle of closed judicial investigations, while the first family refuses to dance to the pan-blue camp's tune.
Chen does not want to dance to the tune of the opposition because he thinks the recall motion smacks of political infighting. He has therefore decided not to submit a rebuttal statement to the legislature, choosing instead to address the public on television last night to explain why the 10 main reasons for recalling him do not make sense. That decision has already incurred criticism from the opposition for what it views as disrespect for the legislature and the Constitution. However, the Constitution does not stipulate that the president must submit a rebuttal to a recall motion initiated by the legislature. Since a legislative majority of two-thirds is required to pass a recall motion, it is unlikely to clear the legislature.
When Chen told the public on TV last night his reasons for opposing the recall, he tried to remedy the asymmetrical flow of information regarding the recall, as well as give himself and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) an opportunity to launch a counterattack.
But Chen's refusal to clarify in detail the widely debated allegations of the first family's involvement in corruption scandals is less than what the public expected from the president. Those allegations are the focus of the pan-blue camp's attacks, as well as media interest and public concern. They involve the first family, and apart from Chen himself, no one else can clear up these allegations.
If Chen remains quiet, the pan-blue camp and media will continue their reckless and uninhibited muckraking, and the asymmetric information and allegations against the first family will continue to flow freely, while the truth will remain lost in the political labyrinth of hard-to-define truths and untruths. Chen's report to the public may have helped consolidate core supporters against the recall motion, but it will not do much to restore public confidence in the president.
The bribery and corruption cases are now under official investigation. But with the legislative vote scheduled for next week, the judiciary's findings will come too late. Since there is not enough time to unearth the truth, both the DPP and the opposition will have to rely on political means such as their legislative clout or launch demonstrations in support of or against Chen. Politicians do not treat the truth with respect, nor is their ability to review their own actions improving. And that is the real threat to Taiwan's democracy.
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