Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) just-concluded Australia visit received saturation coverage in the media in Australia. Coming so soon after the visits of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, it suddenly seemed like Australia had become an important international destination for the world's political heavyweights.
There was a sense that this "lucky country" has something going for it that China has placed it on top of its league. Indeed it has, because Australia has an abundance of many of the raw materials that China needs in order to sustain its continued industrialization and rapid economic growth. China is not only keen to buy these materials, but it is also seeking to invest in these areas.
The most important reason behind China's interest in Australia, therefore, is its insatiable desire for raw materials, which it is busy buying up around the world. Australia is one vast quarry waiting to be dug deeper. As China's ambassador put it in an interview some time ago, "most of the things China needs now can be found here. Chinese companies are also ready to invest overseas and many of them are coming here to look for opportunities."
Australia seems only too willing to oblige, as evidenced by the signing of the deal to sell uranium during Wen's visit. Notwithstanding Canberra's attempts to downplay its sale of uranium to China by mentioning the efficacy of international and bilateral safeguards, there is no actual way it can ensure that the uranium will be used for peaceful means. China could simply divert its own stock of uranium for military uses while replacing it with Australian uranium.
Canberra knows that it is obfuscating the issue. Even as Australian Prime Minister John Howard emphasized the rigorous nature of safeguards developed since the 1970s, he also said that "a certain degree of good faith" was needed when selling uranium.
Besides, "I don't think she [China] is going to lightly give up the fairly hard-won reputation that she is trying to get" of being a responsible power by cheating and using the uranium uses for military purposes, he said.
Indeed, according to Howard, "We see it as in the interests of this country, the interests of our region and, indeed, the interests of the world to be an active partner in the long journey China has begun towards realizing her full potential."
Howard's arguments lack rigor and conviction. That is why he is using over-blown rhetoric to still his own doubts. After all, not long ago China was regarded as a serious threat to regional security.
But why worry when there are millions of dollars to be made.
Wen is keen to underpin China's growing economic relationship with periodic high level political consultations between the two countries. To this end, he proposed annual meetings between China and Australia at the premier or vice-premier level. And he is advocating a speedy conclusion of a free-trade agreement between the two countries within the next year or two.
In the midst of all the celebrations marking Wen's visit, the news that Australia had signed a deal in 2002 to supply uranium to a Taiwanese energy company, via the US, created a bit of a stir. Australia was able to skirt Taiwan's sovereignty issue by going through the US, thus assuaging China's ego. Besides, Taiwan only has civilian nuclear power plants, and is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and inspections. Therefore, there is no danger of Australian uranium being used for military purposes, as might happen with China.
Still, the news of the deal seemed to upset the Chinese, although they did not react to it publicly. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer reportedly said that considerable diplomatic effort had been made behind the scenes to reassure Beijing that this was not an unfriendly act. The deal is, however, unlikely to damage Beijing's relationship with Canberra in view of China's strong need for Australian materials.
Australia's major problem though is how to harmonize its political and security interests, in terms of its alliance with the US, and its economic interests, from its growing relationship with China. Howard doesn't seem to think it will be a problem and Wen certainly doesn't find any problems there.
Wen conceded that "there are differences between China and the US, but they are not antagonistic or confrontational in nature. There is an extensive fusion of interests in many areas."
And he was heartened by Downer's remarks that "a policy of containment of China would be a very big mistake."
In other words, as long as Australia is mindful of China's interests and goals, Beijing would be content; even though this would be tantamount to weakening Australia's partnership with the US.
Though Australia is making all the right noises in order to please China, it remains concerned about Beijing's lack of transparency concerning its defense and strategic goals. According to a Foreign Affairs report, "the uncertainty about China's military budget and the capability of its forces creates an atmosphere of mistrust and conjecture." It, therefore, suggests that China should make details of its military spending and capability more "accurate and comprehensive."
According to Downer, China has "to understand that if it becomes more powerful and more influential in the region, that can arouse sensitivities and so it has to make a very constructive contribution to the affairs of the region."
Canberra believes though that it can play a bridging role between China and the US and, generally, with the West. And Beijing is encouraging Canberra in this regard. As its ambassador in Canberra has said, "Australia can help China to understand the world better, and help the world understand China."
Indeed, some Australians are starting to believe in their country's uniqueness and destiny.
Beijing, though, is not as starry-eyed, even when saying all the right things. In a column last April, Peter Hartcher, political editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, quoted Tang Guanghui (
But Hartcher was unfazed and felt that Tang had used the wrong metaphor for Australia. He instead compared it to a platypus, a native species, which "defies classification, with features of a mammal and a bird, yet is perfectly adapted to its ecology." He added, "It [the platypus] combines the useful features of each and has no need to choose and lives in hope that there will be no war between the kingdoms."
Australia's view of China is a strange mix of hope and, at the same time, hedging its bets with its US alliance. The hope might work for some time but is no substitute for a coherent and common-sense policy.
If Canberra takes upon itself the task of promoting China's cause in the US and elsewhere, it might find itself in the position of the proverbial "bat," shunned both in bird and beast kingdoms; notwithstanding the "platypus" metaphor. Tang might have the last word if Australia persists with its China syndrome.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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