Robert Ross wrote an article titled "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," (Foreign Affairs, Volume 85, No. 2) to purportedly toll the final bell for Taiwan's independence supporters and usher in the new era of a pro-unification Taiwan.
Addressing the Taiwan independence movement with a severely jaundiced view, the article exemplifies a growing misconception among international commentators that equates the popularity of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) with the Taiwanese people's pro-unification sentiment.
Added to this is the mirror-image trend of their equating the popularity of President Chen Shui-bian (
This assertion has been largely dismantled by Ma's recent comments, which have caused great consternation among his deep-blue constituents. Ma conceded the possibility that the Taiwanese people might eventually want to choose formal independence for Taiwan. Ma's move immediately after that to reaffirm the KMT's avowed ultimate goal of unification muddled his message, but did nothing to alter the fact that Ma's popularity and public pro-unification sentiment in Taiwan do not go hand-in-hand.
But international expectations could crescendo around the time of Ma's presumed inauguration as president in 2008 to a point where violent turmoil in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait might be unavoidable.
The problem stems from the strong probability that heightened international expectations at that time could exert formidable pressure on Beijing to force a quick merger between Taiwan and China -- regardless of whether Taiwan is ready -- to save face for Beijing. This underscores the inescapable perils of a Ma presidency, should he continue to equivocate.
Ma's difficulties begin with the fact that his popularity is based on false pretenses. His supporters believe that he can best deal with Beijing to improve Taiwan's economy, in addition to maintaining Taiwan's status as a de facto independent and sovereign country, whose eventual status will be determined by the 23 million people of Taiwan in the distant future. These beliefs will be immediately and severely tested the moment Ma comes into contact with Beijing in his capacity as president of Taiwan.
Any of his defiance to Bei-jing in the context of Taiwan's status as a de facto sovereign entity -- for instance, his rejection of a "unification timetable" or reluctance to outlaw Taiwan's independence movement -- would quickly bring catastrophe to the Taiwanese people. That's because "losing face" internationally bodes ill for the survival of Beijing's regime, given the hyped up international expectations.
Therefore it is imperative that Ma clarify unequivocally to the Taiwanese people that his future engagement with Beijing would entail relinquishing Taiwan's sovereignty and outlawing Taiwan's independence movement. He should also admit that he would have little control over a "unification timetable" and that all his talk regarding the options for the Taiwanese people would eventually come to nought. This would minimize the potential for internal strife if he were elected as Taiwan's president.
Given Ma and the KMT's desperate ambition to regain power in Taiwan, Beijing will be intentionally wasting an opportunity to resolve cross-strait tensions if it continues to shun the Chen administration in the next two years. This would be even more regrettable now that the Chen administration has regained some political footing by scrapping the National Unification Council and its guidelines.
But apparently bent on waiting out Chen, Beijing is busy getting international voices to echo its claim on Taiwan. Beijing even complained about Chen's behavior to the UN, marking the first time Beijing brought cross-Taiwan Strait issues to the international body. Previously, China always told the international community that cross-strait relations were a purely domestic problem.
But rather than nudging Taiwan under Chen any closer into Beijing's grip, these maneuvers may have inadvertently succeeded in putting pressure on Beijing to force the Taiwan issue if Ma become the next Taiwanese president.
Only the Taiwanese voters can stop this mad race to rain disaster on Taiwan. The Taiwanese people's fate is in their own hands.
Huang Jei-hsuan
California
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