The meanings of the English words abolish, terminate, freeze and suspend are clear and they all have their Mandarin equivalents. Despite this, these words were all ignored during negotiations between the US and Taiwan last Monday. Instead, the unclear word "cease" was adopted.
In Mandarin, the word "cease" can be translated as zhongzhi (終止 or 中止), but to be exact, the word zhongzhi should be translated as "terminate." Both the Taiwanese and the US sides are aware of this, and the use of the word "cease" is intended to let each side have its own interpretation.
After last Monday, the US has repeatedly interpreted the word "cease" to mean "freeze," while Taiwan has continued to equivocate on the meaning of the word zhongzhi, merely stressing that a consensus has yet to be reached on the cessation of the National Unification Council (NUC) and its guidelines.
Apart from stressing the US position, Washington officials at first appeared to think that there was no need to put more pressure on Taiwan. Then, unexpectedly, the American Institute in Taiwan requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explain whether or not it took the word "cease" to mean "abolish." The result was that AIT officials found from videotapes of the press conference that although Taiwanese reporters and a few legislators made a big deal of saying that zhongzhi means "abolish," no official ever said that.
This should have resolved the matter. But surprisingly, the US then requested that Taiwan admit that the NUC still exists. The US clearly reneged on the tacit agreement that each side be allowed its own interpretation of the meaning of the word "cease."
It is not at all unheard of to have individual interpretations of words in this way. In the communique establishing diplomatic relations between China and the US, the English text says that the US "acknowledges" China's position that there is only "one China" which includes Taiwan, while the Chinese side insists on using the Mandarin word for "recognizes." Each side has its own interpretation of the meaning of "acknowledge," as dictated by their own needs.
These different interpretations of the word "cease" imply that the US does not have the means to force Taiwan to act as the US wishes in every instance. In the same way, the US and China's different interpretations of the meaning of the word "acknowledge" imply that China does not have the means to force the US to unambiguously "recognize" that Taiwan is part of the People's Republic of China.
Now that the US wants Taiwan to offer yet another concession while at the same time humiliating President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), I'm afraid that the greatest concession Chen is prepared to offer is to say that no official has used the word "abolish," and that he will not "recognize" the continued existence of the NUC.
The reason that Taiwan is not able to accept everything the US wants is that although the two countries' interests overlap, there are also interests that Taiwan cannot give up. The US cannot make Taiwan do everything exactly as it wants, because although there are great differences in the strength and bargaining chips that the US, China and Taiwan possess in the international political arena, Taiwan is not completely without leverage. Great powers such as the US and China cannot always take what they want when they want it, and a small country can take advantage of the interests it shares with such great powers to protect its own interests.
Because the timing isn't ideal, however, only some 20 percent of voters support Chen's wish to abolish the NUC and the unification guidelines -- a figure that corresponds to the number of staunch DPP supporters. Almost 50 percent, however, do not support the move. This shows that while Chen's attempt to abolish the council and guidelines may have consolidated his leadership with staunch Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters, he has lost his more moderate supporters.
The pan-blue camp, on the other hand, believes that abolishing the NUC and its guidelines will lead to immediate cross-strait tension. But this is only the result of defeatism. China's actions are counterintuitive insofar as it continues to offer more and more benefits to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) as part of its united-front strategy, while at the same time risking an open break with the KMT by mooting direct contact with the DPP.
China has now understood that its strongest bargaining chips are not to be found in increasing pressure across the Taiwan Strait, but rather in diplomacy regarding Iran, North Korea and India. This, however, should already have been clear by the time the US accepted the use of the word "cease" in English and zhongzhi in Mandarin. If China changes its plans now, the most likely reason is that it is worried that Chen will implement his seven points, which he announced on Jan. 30, 2000.
For someone who has always worked for Taiwan independence and who has managed to work out a situation where the US and Taiwan have their own interpretation of the meaning of the word "cease" in relation to the NUC and its guidelines, the most reasonable strategy would be to put things on hold for a while.
Chen, however, is doing all he can to consolidate his support from his deep-green base, and this is something that the US clearly understands. The radical faction feels that it has won a great victory and is working actively to expand that victory. So Chen displayed an aggressive attitude during the 228 memorial service, and the DPP has planned a series of activities because it worries that Chen's seven points will be abandoned and forgotten.
The US has to do something big to prevent this from happening, and that is the reason why it made its request on Mar. 3.
Regardless of what happens, we must not take the pan-blue approach and say that Taiwan has no leverage in the relationship between the US, China and Taiwan. What we should do is use the leverage that we do have at opportune moments and apply it where it counts. If we don't, the case for Taiwan independence will take two steps back instead of one step forward.
Lin Cho-shui is a Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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