If anyone ever had lingering doubts about Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) abilities as a Harvard-trained lawyer, they were almost certainly put to rest during his recent interview with the BBC's Hardtalk television program.
Ma's legalistic ability to disarm his opponents through obfuscation and equivocation, as well as his obdurate refusal to commit to answering difficult questions were on full display. Despite host Stephen Sackur's tried-and-tested ability to rhetorically manhandle namby-pamby politicos like the Taipei mayor, Ma made a Herculean effort and avoided giving straight answers to simple questions.
Almost the only question to which Ma could give a direct answer was the very first of the interview:
"Does China pose a threat to Taiwan?" Sackur asked.
"Yes," was the only reply Ma could muster, as though he'd been taken off guard by the novelty of the idea. After that, he quickly regained his footing.
"How grave a threat?" was Sackur's response.
"Uh ... depends on the type of ... uh ... situation you are talking about," Ma blathered, launching into a verbose exchange about China's missiles and military maneuvers.
Naturally, this led into tougher questions about why the KMT was blocking the arms procurement deal with the US. Ma regurgitated the well-worn lines about supporting "reasonable" arms purchases. What he did not do, and what the KMT has never been able to do, is explain how, exactly, it intends to ensure that Taiwan is able to defend itself.
What weapons systems should Taiwan invest in? What military programs should be focused on? What is the most effective way to ensure that Taiwan's people have the ability to determine their own future in the face of China's threat?
If you're hoping for answers to these questions, don't look to Ma.
Still, the spectacle of Ma squirming under Sackur's grilling provided some comic relief. Watching Ma attempt to justify former KMT chairman Lien Chan's (
Indeed, if there is a ghost that has been doggedly haunting Ma ever since he took the reins of the KMT, it is the ghost of Lien and the party's ossified Cold-War era policies. The only defense Ma could muster, after some impressive oratorical contortions, was some drivel about the need for direct cross-strait flights.
Things got so uncomfortable for Ma that he eventually broke into an outburst that bordered on racial chauvinism to prevent Sackur from embarrassing him. The trouble came after Sackur tried to nail down Ma's position on unification.
"You don't actually believe in an independent, sovereign Taiwan in the future, do you? You actually believe in one China and unification," Sackur said.
"No, no, no. You don't understand what these terms mean. You're not very much familiar with Chinese affairs and Taiwanese affairs," Ma told the host, as if Sackur -- a veteran journalist with a team of researchers supporting him -- had not just spent the past 20 minutes asking him detailed, probing questions about almost every important issue in Taiwan's affairs.
Needless to say, Ma dodged the question, and blithely ignored Sackur when he pointed out the contradictory comments Ma had made about the topic.
Nevertheless, Ma did offer one very instructive insight during the interview:
"Only the people in power could sell out Taiwan," he said midway through the show.
This is an interesting point. And it is one that voters should bear in mind in 2008.
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