President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) Lunar New Year remarks that he would seriously consider abolishing the National Unification Council and seek UN membership under the name of "Taiwan" have sparked a series of domestic and international debates.
In response to Washington's complaint that Chen had come up with another "surprise" to change the cross-strait status quo, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government denied that there has been any change to Taiwan's policy, saying that Chen's comment was simply a "thought," not a foregone conclusion.
Both Washington and the pan-blue camp should consider why Chen brought up this issue at this time, instead of merely dismissing it as an explicit attempt to cross the "red line" by changing the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
In fact, Chen's remark was a timely reminder to those who have overlooked the extent to which China has developed its military capability to sabotage Taiwan, and its continued strategy to unite with the pan-blue opposition to obstruct the DPP government.
While demanding that Chen abide by what he pledged in his 2000 inaugural speech, both the domestic audience and the international community should re-examine Chen's pledges more fairly.
Chen promised not to declare independence, not to change the national title, not to push the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" model in the Constitution, not to promote a referendum on changing the status quo regarding the question of independence or unification, and not to raise the question of abolishing the National Unification Council and the guidelines for national unification.
But the pledges carry a proviso: They are only valid if China has no intention of attacking Taiwan. And Beijing's aggrandizement of military power, its buildup of ballistic missiles and its authorization of the People's Liberation Army to use force against Taiwan by passing of the so-called "Anti-Secession" Law last March constitute an explicit intention and capability to attack Taiwan.
Ironically, most people tend to unilaterally and unfairly monitor Chen to check if his government has broken the promises, while ignoring the fact that China has continuously expanded its military threat against Taiwan.
A more pragmatic analysis of who exactly is attempting to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait shows that Beijing has been continuously rocking the boat while pointing the finger at Taiwan. When Taiwan complains about China's military intimidation and its political isolation campaign, the whole world often accuses Taiwan of stirring up unnecessary trouble and provoking the "rising China."
Is constantly attacking Taiwan a fair way to judge the cross-strait status quo? Is squeezing Taiwan's throat the most effective way to restrain Beijing's military rise? Can the Taiwanese people be allowed the freedom of choosing their own destiny instead of unilaterally accepting ultimate unification with China?
The main reason why Washington described Chen's announcement as a "surprise" was largely because it would draw an angry response from Beijing.
However, just because the Bush administration does not anticipate any "noise" from the Chen administration, that does not mean the Taiwanese people should pretend Beijing's threats to Taiwan are invisible.
While Washington may be blind to cross-strait reality and consider everything Chen has done to maintain Taiwan's sovereignty and independent nationhood as a threat to the national interest, the pan-blue camp's leaders should be ashamed for failing to uphold Taiwan's national interests against China's "divide and conquer" strategy.
To make things worse, the pan-blues have been brainwashing the Taiwanese with their view of cross-strait relations. Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou
Ma's abuse of his overrated popularity could possibly create a "domino effect" by misleading the public into thinking that Beijing posed only a minimal military threat, thereby undermining the nation's internal unity.
If Ma and the KMT want to regain the presidency in 2008, they should tell the voters right now how they plan to deal with China's military threats. Ma should tell the voters and the international community that it is up to the 23 million Taiwanese people to decide Taiwan's future relationship with China.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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