Sat, Oct 22, 2005 page8

• Beware, the provinces are restless

  • By Paul Lin 林保華
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  Hot air and empty words permeated the recently concluded Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

  This suggests that the growing conflict within the Chinese leadership would reduce the central government's ability to come to grips with increasingly powerful local governments and military factions. To drill deeper into such an issue, we have to take heed of a number of signs.

  Following the Cultural Revolution, the CCP's Central Committee meetings were held once every five years. There has always been significant personnel shifts at each of the fifth plenary sessions -- the incumbent president would arrange for his henchmen to take up important posts during his five-year tenure. Prior to the recently concluded fifth plenum, it was rumored that Chen Liangyu (陳良宇), the Communist Party chief in Shanghai who has close ties to former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民), would be transferred and replaced by Liu Yandong (劉延東), a protege of Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤).

  In addition, many believed that outgoing Liaoning Province party chief Li Keqiang (李克強) would also take up a new post. However, the communique issued at the close of the Fifth Plenary Session did not indicate any personnel changes. This suggests that Hu may have suffered some setbacks during the meeting.

  Second, the main objective of the Fifth Plenary Session is to map out China's 11th Five Year Plan. However, the communique only deals with the nation's GDP goals, and does not outline any specific measures to achieve these goals.

  Although the latest Five Year Plan covers a wide range of issues, such as macroeconomic controls, China's energy crisis, corruption, the disparity between rich and poor, disadvantaged groups, the development of backward regions, scientific development and counterfeit products, the measures employed to tackle these issues all appear incomplete, banal or pointless.

  Third, since Hu and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) came to power, they have been keeping an eye on the establishment of the Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area. This effort is directed at competing with the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone, initiated by former party elders Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽), and the Yangzi River Delta Economic Zone, inaugurated by Jiang and former premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基). That is why Wen toured Tianjin in June, and why Hu inspected the region in October prior to the Fifth Plenary Session, underlining the duo's grand ambitions. However, the communique does not even mention Tianjin. Thus, we can assume that the plan to develop Tianjin has yet to gain widespread support. The reason for this lack of support may be connected to the allocation of resources.

  Fourth, in recent years, China has been making significant concessions to neighboring countries -- ? except Japan -- over territorial disputes. However, the thornier issue facing Beijing is how to resolve border disputes among different autonomous regions and provinces.

  During the Fifth Plenary Session, a Hong Kong media outlet disclosed a document that China's State Department addressed to the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security on how to strengthen the efforts to maintain demarcation between provinces and regions. In this document, Beijing asked local governments to maintain stability on borders and eradicate potential conflict. The Hong Kong media's report also pointed out that to contend for resources, people in different regions would also fight against each other, sometimes resorting to armed conflict. On occasion, it required the intervention of Jiang himself to resolve these disputes.

  Fifth, not long ago, 17 provincial and city governments called on the central government to forbid foreign media from criticizing their actions (the media within China has rarely been allowed to criticize the government), so that they can do as they wish without even foreign oversight.

  One month before the fifth plenum was convened, when Premier Wen was in Guangdong Province conducting a study, an incident in Taishi Village, Panyu County, occurred in which residents tried to depose the village chief. The situation deteriorated, and there was evidence of links between the local government and criminal gangs. Beatings, kidnapping, detention, threats and lies were used to suppress the villagers, British and French reporters were beaten up and a people's representative from Hubei was knocked unconscious. There was a domestic outcry and protests from international groups. Even the US government took an interest. In the face of China's deteriorating reputation abroad, the premier and the central government were impotent, an indication that their authority had been seriously undermined.

  Major General Zhu Chenghu (朱成虎), head of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Beijing's National Defense University, and a nephew of People's Liberation Army hero Zhu De (朱德), is now facing off against Air Force Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou (劉亞洲), a deputy political commissar and the son-in-law of former Chinese president Li Xiannian (李先念), representing hawkish and dovish factions respectively. What has happened to military discipline? And what can the central government do? Does the government direct the military or does the military direct the government?

  The day after the fifth plenum ended on Oct. 11, the Shenzhou VI rocket was launched. On the same day, Hu Jintao returned to Nanking, his power base. But more especially, he was there to monitor military bases.

  As the center has weakened, regional and military factions have become more powerful, creating a greater number of variables affecting China's future. It recalls China's division at the end of the Qing Dynasty, when the Western powers invaded and the regions sought to protect themselves. When the spark of revolution was ignited in Wuchang in 1911, the provinces declared independence one after the other, spelling the end of the Qing empire. Could this also be happening to China's communist empire?

  The weakening of centralized power will benefit Hong Kong's autonomy, and is also an opportunity for Taiwan, which already has its own sovereignty. But Taiwan must respond correctly to China's "united front" tactics, and be especially wary of its efforts to intensify foreign struggles, to increase internal cohesion and maintain its grip on power. A conflict with Taiwan would be devastating for the coastal economies, so is it not likely that the provinces would protect their interests and refuse to enter the fray?

  Paul Lin is a commentator based in New York.

  TRANSLATED BY DANIEL CHENG AND IAN BARTHOLOMEW
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