Peace in the Pacific is in the hands of the Taiwanese people. However, the current drift of thought and policy may imperil both the nation's ability to determine its own destiny and the long-term stability of the region.
Taiwan finds itself in a potential dynamic of decline. In the current dynamic, a rising China attracts direct foreign investment that used to go to Taipei. China's economy charges ahead at a rate twice as fast as that of Taiwan, and China translates this economic advantage into a military build-up while gaining diplomatic leverage in capitals across the world. Pressure may build and lead Taiwanese leaders to observe these developments and decide that an arms race is futile.
They will hope that Washington will be the ultimate guarantor of stability in the region. In such a situation, which could come to fruition within 10 years, Taiwan will have fewer options for its future, and a national security policy based on wishful thinking.
It is time for Taipei to break out of the current dynamic of decline, to preserve options for its own future and ensure the peace and stability of the region and perhaps the world. I offer some thoughts on a new strategic vision to achieve these ends.
First, a look at the motivations and capabilities of China should be the starting point for a new Taiwanese security strategy. While one of China's prime objectives is preserving its "territorial integrity," the other values that seem to be at least as important are economic development and international prestige and acceptance. This is the pressure point upon which Taipei can focus when building a new security policy.
The political decision in Beijing on whether to take hostile action against Taipei will always include a calculation of the cost in terms of economic development and international prestige. If Beijing cannot win a conflict quickly, it runs the risk of disrupting trade and investment flows.
If Beijing resorts to the use of missile attacks on civilian populations or blockades that last for weeks and months, it is liable to look like the bully in international public opinion. If Beijing's forces face the prospect of suffering military defeat, even briefly, the loss of face to any regime in Beijing may be too great to bear.
Taking advantage of these strategic weaknesses will ensure a security posture that allows Taiwan to have freedom of action in its political dealings with China. A new strategic vision requires bold political and military initiatives.
Taiwan could consider a pledge to never launch an attack against a civilian target in China under any circumstances. Such a pledge in peacetime might help further dialogue, and in time of conflict, put Taiwan in a position to win the world's sympathy and put Beijing in the role of aggressor.
The new strategy should be to intercept and defeat any and all aggressors in the air and on the seas. If troops land and establish beachheads in Taiwan, it will likely be too late for help to arrive from the international community. In any conflict, Taiwan needs to be seen as the plucky underdog defending itself against great odds, and inflicting such losses that any aggressor would quickly lose face -- first, because of its clear aggression and second, for its inability to quickly prevail.
In terms of military posture, Taipei could consider a true revolution in military strategy by shifting to a professional military almost entirely focused on air and sea defense. The strategic need for the defense of Taiwan is to raise the costs of aggression by China to unacceptable levels and to gain the world's sympathy in a conflict. This means that Taiwan's armed forces must be restructured.
The Taiwanese navy could acquire new fleets of the most advanced diesel/electric submarines, minesweepers and minelayers and waves of high-speed torpedo boats. The goal of naval force structure should be the ability to break blockades and defeat seaborne invasion forces. Force levels would need to increase to meet the increase in capabilities.
The Taiwanese air force should focus on hardening and dispersing airfields to withstand attack, developing early-warning radar, increasing the number of fighter squadrons and acquiring a new generation of attack helicopters that are equipped to attack submarines and landing craft.
The Taiwanese army could be restructured to become an entirely "special forces capable" force. The army could reduce its numbers while greatly improving its mobility and lethality. The new army would train along the lines of US special forces such as the Green Berets or Rangers. Their missions would shift from static defense to disruption of enemy military installations during an invasion and rapid strike capability against any initial beachheads made on Taiwanese soil.
Such a military restructuring would allow for the end of conscription and the total professionalization of the military. Such a plan could enhance support for the mission of the military as its defensive role would be clarified by structure and doctrine. This plan could give a boost to the economy by allowing tens of thousands of young people to enter the job market rather than being conscripted.
The goal of this and any national security strategy should be for options to remain open for the future of the free and democratic people who call Taiwan home. This new national security strategy could place Taiwan in an enhanced diplomatic position, lead the way for peace in the Taiwan Strait and improve capabilities so that some forces in Beijing will not be tempted to miscalculate and introduce military pressure into an already sensitive situation, thus preserving peace in the Pacific.
Scott Bates is a senior fellow at the National Security Center for National Policy in Washington.
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