The method used by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to pass its "anti-secession" law differs from the method used in the past. Traditionally, draft legislation is discussed in negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government before being submitted by the State Council or a relevant government body to the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee for review; or the committee is asked to submit it to the NPC for review.
This time, however, the NPC Standing Committee itself took the initiative to submit the bill to the NPC for review. The reason it did this was to highlight the high level of public consensus in China regarding the enactment of the anti-secession law in an attempt to avoid pressure from the international community on the CCP and government bodies.
But, given the democratic centralism in China's Constitution, the CCP leadership's principles and the reality of the CCP's party-ruled state, it would be unthinkable that the NPC could enact legislation without the guidance or tacit agreement of the CCP.
This shows the CCP's strong determination to enact the anti-secession law. This shows that the CCP has understood how manipulating public opinion support and help legitimize its policies.
Continued manipulation of the legislation process could also serve to offset or re-direct the effects from the anti-Communist uproar that could result from the death of the CCP's former general secretary Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽), which would help stabilize their hold on power.
From the drafting of the anti-secession law by the NPC Standing Committee's legal system work group and the review of the draft by the Central Committee to the NPC session, the contents of the bill have remained secret. The official position is that the law is still being reviewed, and it is not yet time to announce it to the public.
Since the legislative processes of the NPC and its Central Committee are not open to the public, we must ask ourselves whether this is really a government agency representing public opinion. How does the NPC Central Committee find out what the public thinks?
Have the symposia, debates and public hearings stipulated in Article 34 of the Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China really been widely adopted as a way to ensure the participation of those with different opinions? Has China consulted Taiwanese people residing in China, who are likely to be affected by this law? Or could it be that other than showing support for the motives behind the anti-secession legislation, people have no way to express their concern over the law's structure, content, execution and other technical issues?
Furthermore, according to Article 27 of the Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China, legal bills included on the agenda at a meeting of the Standing Committee should be reviewed three times before being submitted to a vote. And, according to the regulations in Article 28, Clause 1, legal bills on the agenda at a meeting of the Standing Committee -- and on which opinions are closer to being unanimous -- may be submitted to a vote after two reviews.
Although the anti-secession law was not written by the NPC, judging from the decision to submit it for review by the NPC, it is given far more importance than other laws. It was only reviewed once by the NPC Standing Committee at its meeting in December.
The Standing Committee meets once every two months, and under normal circumstances, it should take six months to pass any piece of legislation.
The fact that the anti-secession law will be passed at the two-week NPC meeting -- despite its contents yet having to be announced -- further shows how the legal process is lacking in respect for public opinion and how it violates legal principles.
There is a very simple reason why China does not want any public discussion about the anti-secession law -- because the CCP's leaders want to control public opinion. They do not want dissenting voices to be heard either domestically or internationally, because that would destroy their legal war on Taiwan.
If the anti-secession law includes definitions and sentencing regulations for "blocking unification" or "engaging in secessionist activities," and if an anti-secession court is set up, then Taiwanese institutions, groups or people connected to anyone in Taiwan deemed to engage in secessionist activities would all be seen as accomplices.
The reason the PRC still hasn't annexed Taiwan is because it can't, although it does have the power to implement totalitarian rule in China. Even if the anti-secession law is promulgated, China cannot guarantee that it will be able to annex Taiwan. It can, however, guarantee that it will use this law as a tool to control and suppress domestic secessionist groups.
The law's true target is not the Taiwanese people. China has no jurisdiction over Taiwanese people in Taiwan. The target will become Chinese officials and members of the public who have been deemed as doing too little to oppose secessionist activities.
In his report to the 15th NPC in September 1997, former CCP party secretary-general Jiang Zemin (江澤民) described his view of the principle of a nation ruled by law by saying that ruling a country by law means integrating leaders who are true to the party and believe in the power of the people and strict legal procedures. In the anti-secession law, we only see the traces of party leaders, and nothing of the people's power or strict legal procedures. Is that a step back for socialist law, or is it the face of the future?
Tseng Chien-yuan is the vice director of the department of legal and constitutional study at the Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Ya-ti Lin and Perry Svensson
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