North Korea's announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons has fueled a diplomatic frenzy. To persuade North Korea to return to the six-party talks -- with China, Japan, the US, Russia and South Korea -- on defusing the nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, the US and South Korea have now offered to expand the scope of the talks to allow North Korea to raise any issue that concerns it. This could be a grave mistake.
The talks ground to a halt in June last year, when the North Koreans pulled out, citing the allegedly hostile policies of the US and Japanese governments. Now they claim to have manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense. Although there had been several unofficial statements by Kim Jong-il's regime admitting that North Korea possesses a nuclear arsenal, the announcement was the first official confirmation.
What lay behind the declaration was the regime's recognition that a second-term Bush administration would not soften its demand for a complete repudiation of its nuclear program, but would instead continue to pursue policies aimed at isolating and stifling North Korea. The same goes for Japan, whose stance on the abduction of its citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s was also cited by the Kim regime last June as a reason for walking out of the six-party talks.
With this in mind, the North Koreans' motives in playing the nuclear trump card are clear, and the timing couldn't have seemed more advantageous for them: Force the Americans into making concessions while the situation in Iraq leaves the US with no room to maneuver, and undercut the rising call in Japan for economic sanctions against North Korea over the abduction issue. Thus, whereas North Korea's announcement of its nuclear capability strongly condemned Japan and the US, it did not mention China, Russia and South Korea, which had been more conciliatory during the six-party talks.
Indeed, in withdrawing from the talks, North Korea did not completely abandon the possibility of resolving the nuclear standoff through dialogue. Rather, North Korea's aim was to postpone the six-party talks as long as possible in order to force direct bilateral negotiations with the US, in which it would presumably extract energy assistance and other aid while demanding a security guarantee for "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il.
The US didn't budge on bilateral negotiations and its response to North Korea's recent announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons likewise emphasized the need to revive the six-party talks. Japan adopted a similar stance.
Like Japan, the Bush administration's relatively moderate stance toward North Korea has changed since the talks broke down last year. The US seems to be tightening its diplomatic encirclement of North Korea with a view to shifting the nuclear discussion to the UN Security Council.
Moreover, the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee brought together the countries' foreign and defense ministers in Washington last month to discuss common strategic objectives related to the reformation of US forward forces. This includes US forces in Japan, which will focus on responding to North Korean nuclear and ballistic-missile threats, as well as new threats posed by international terrorism and China's military build-up. Remaining in step with each other on security issues is essential if Japan and the US are to maintain a firm alliance to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
The Japanese government has also been searching for effective measures to respond to North Korea's consistently insincere attitude on regional and bilateral issues, including the abduction cases. Militarily, Japan revised its law on the Self-Defense Forces to establish procedures for ballistic missile defense, with a strong focus on North Korea.
The decision, coming at the Cabinet's regular meeting on Feb. 15, was not intended to coincide with Kim's 63rd birthday the following day. But it did show that Japan's government, having long suspected that North Korea already possessed nuclear weapons, would not be intimidated into a fundamental policy change by confirmation of the threat.
The revision establishes the future direction of Japan's military posture by delegating greater authority to the commanders of the Self-Defense Forces to initiate defensive actions against immediate threats. According to South Korean news reports, in addition to its existing mid-range Nodong missiles, North Korea has improved its Scud missiles, extending their range to reach Japan's main islands. If North Korea is, indeed, continuing to develop not only its nuclear arsenal, but also various types of ballistic missiles, in defiance of international commitments, it is truly a rogue state.
As for the nuclear issue, Japan's policy toward North Korea should continue to emphasize solidifying ties with the US and strengthening cooperation with China, South Korea and Russia, making every effort to promote early resumption of the six-party talks. But dialogue with the Kim regime cannot be an end in itself. Negotiation is necessary, and it must be sufficient, but progress will be impossible if North Korea is allowed to turn its mere participation in the talks into a bargaining chip.
Hideaki Kaneda, retired vice admiral of Japan's Self Defense Forces, is currently director of the Okazaki Institute.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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